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IN THE 
Supreme Court of· Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1437 
L. C. WRIGHT AND F. L. FORBES, TRADING AS PIED-
MONT CAFE, 
vs. 
l{IRBY E. VIAR, AN INFANT, BY I-II8 NEXT FRIEND, 
J. E. VIAR. 
Petition for a Writ of Error. 
From the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg. 
Your petitioners, L. C. Wright and F. L.. Forbes, trading 
as Piedmont Cafe, respectfully represent that they are greatly 
aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court for the City 
of I.~ynchburg in an action at law brought against them by 
l{irby E. Viar, an infant, by J·. E. Viar, his next friend, ren-
dered on the 1st day of April, 1933, against your petitioners, 
for the sum of $300.00 and costs. A duly authenticated tran-
script of the record is attached hereto as a part of this peti-
tion. 
PRELIJ\1INARY. 
The parties will be referred to in the positions which they 
occupied in the trial court. Plaintiff instituted his Notice 
of :h1:otion for Judgment for damages for personal injuries 
alleged to have been sustained by him on account of the neg-
ligent operation by.L. C. vVright of an automobile belonging 
------- ------
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to F. L. Forbes, trading as Piedmont ~Cafe, for whom Wright 
was at the time driving. There ·was a verdict and judgment 
for $300.00 against both defendants. 
THE FACTS. 
As to many of the material facts, there is practically no 
conflict. Under the familiar rule of~ decision in this State, 
the verdict of the jury (approved 1by the trial court), has 
settled all material conflicts in the evjdence favorably to the 
_successful litigant. We shall, therefore, undertake to state 
the case in the most favorable aspect to the plaintiff. The 
accident, which resul~ed in the injury complained of, occurred 
in the City of Lynchburg. on Main S.treet, about 10 P.. ~L 
Saturday night, January 7, 1933, and approximately at the 
intersection of 1\{ain and Ninth. Main Street runs approxi-
mately north and south. The defendant, L. C. Wright, im-
mediately preceding the accident had hif? automobile parked 
on the east side of Main Street headed north. His automo-
bile was the last car in a line of automobiles parked on thit:; 
side of the street. and 'vas a distance variously estimated at 
15 or 20 feet from the intersection. of Ninth Street with 
Main. There were at the time of the accident, white lines 
crossing Main Street indicating the line which pedestrians 
should take in crossing at this intersection. Kirby Yiar, a 
young boy seventeen years of age, was riding his motorcycle 
along Main Street, proceeding in a northerly direction, or 
the same direction in which the defendants' car was ·headed. 
The motorcycle on which he was riding ran into the left rear 
of the automobile operated by L. C. Wright, after Wright 
had moved from his standstill position into Main Street, and 
the damage complained of resulted. 
ASSIGNMENTS O]J' ERROR. 
Your petitioners assign as error the action of the Court in 
the following particulars, to-wit: 
1. In refusing to sustain the defendants' motion to strike 
out the evidence of t:P.e plaintiff. (R., 46, 85.) 
2. In giving plaintiff's instruction No. 2. (R., 85, 87.) 
3. In refusing· defendants' instruction C: (R~, 90.) 
4. In refush;tg to set aside the verdict and enter up a judg-
ment for the defendants on the ground that the verdict was 
contrary to the law and the evidence, and without evidence 
to support it. (R., 9, 10.) . . _ . 
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ARGUMENT. 
Error of Court in refusing to str.ike out the evidence a;nd 
subsequently in refusing to set aside the verdict of the Jury . 
.All of the assignments of error involved sll!bstantially the 
same question, and it will be unnecessary to consider them· 
separately. The assignments of error, even to the giving 
and refusing of instructions relate to two propositions, (1) 
.that there was no evidence· of primary negligence on the part 
of the defendants; (2) that the plaintiff's own evidence 
showed him to be plainly guilty of contributory negligence. 
We shall, therefore, endeavor to point out our theory of the 
case and the consequent error of the court in not adopting the 
same. The consideration of the error of the Court in refus-
ing to strike out the evidence and subsequently in refusing 
to set aside the verdict of the jury make a careful considera-
tion of the ev:idence necessary. The additional facts will, 
therefore, fully appear under this discussion of these assign-
ments of error. Where the assignments of error overlap, the 
Court's attention will be directed to it. 
·. The only allegation of negligence was based upon a viola-
tion of S'ection 2154 ( 122) of the Motor Vehicle Code of Vir-
ginia, in that the driver Wright failed to giv-e the signal re-
quired by that section of his intention to start from the stand-
still position which he occupied before moving out into Main 
Street. No other allegation of negligence is made and none 
was sought to be established. The plaintiff to prove the al-
legation of negligence introduced two witnesses other than 
himself. He testified very fully about the accident (R., 28-45). 
Plaintiff's ·witness G. L. Bobbitt makes no statement in re-
gard to the signal at all, and for that reason we can eliminate 
him from consideration. We may also eliminate from con-
sideration the testimony of plaintiff's witness Vernon Bry-
ant, who simply states that he did not see any signal given, 
and that he did not contend that one was not in fact given. 
It is upon the plaintiff's own testimony that his case must 
stand or fall, although we will have occasion to advert to 
certain uncontroverted facts which appear from the defend-
ant's testimony. 
· Iri discussing the plaintiff's testimony and the legal infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom, we shall bear in mind the salu-
tary rule now long settled in Virginia, which forbids a plain-
tiff to make his case any stronger than he hims·elf makes it. 
The rule was recently well ·settled in Thalhimer Bros. vs. 
Casci (Va.), 168 S. E. 433. 
Supreme Court of .Appeals of ·virginia. 
''Conflicts in testimony are usually for the jury, but this 
is not always true. When a plaintiff has testified to facts 
within his knowledge upon which his case turns, he 'must 
abide by his state'm,ents. He cannot rest his recovery upon the 
evidence of others. He cannot ask a jury to believe that his 
accO'lmt of the transaction is not to be relied upon. IJ!lassie vs. 
Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S. E. 652; Davis Bakery vs. 
Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 640, 124 S. E.- 411; Bassett & Co. vs. 
Wood, 146 Va. 654, 660, 132 S. E. 700; lJtlaryland Casual,ty Co. 
vs; Cole, 156 Va. 707, 158 S. E·. 873." (Italics ours.) 
In this ease, however, the situation is even somewhat dif-
ferent from the ·rule as referred to in these authorities, for 
the plaintiff was certainly his own best witness. 
Before entering· upon the arg11ment, we wish to draw the 
Court's attention to certain uncontroverted facts about the 
loc~£s in quo and the position of the cars immediately after 
the accident. It will be re·rnembered that the defendants' 
automobile was parked on the righthand side of the street 
headed north, which was the same direction in which the 
plaintiff Viar was proceeding. !lis car was parked within 
the white linc·s designated for such parking, and was the 
last car of a number of cars parked in a similar fashion. As 
stated, from the rear end of his car to the point at which 
Ninth Street intersects with Main was a distance variously 
estimated at from 15 to 20 feet. The testimony was to the 
effect that the defendants' car was about 2 or 3 feet from 
the car parked immediately in front of him. After the ac-
cident a police officer (Burruss, R., 47-51) acting in the 
course of his official capacity, was summoned to investi-
gate the accident. He g·ot to the scene of the accident before 
the automobile had been mov:ed. Ifis uncontradicted state-
ment was to the effect that the automobile was sitting prac-
tically straight in the street, that is to say, about parallelling 
the car tracks in the street. He states that it was sitting 
a distance of 16 feet from the curb. He also stated that the 
defendant Wright pointed out to him where his car had been 
parked prior to the accident. ],rom that point to the point 
at which the car stopped 'vas 24 feet. It can readily be seen 
that if the defendants' car was parked approximately 15 or 
20 feet from the corner and that when it came to a stop after 
the accident, it was at a point 24 feet from this point, that it 
had proceeded approximately forty odd feet from the in-
tersection of Ninth with ~fain. It is well to note that there 
~s no dispute about the position of the cars, nor the manner 
in which the motorcycle struck the automobile. It is also un-
L. C. Wright & other, v. Kirby E. Viar, an Infant, etc. 5 
disputed that the defendants' automobile stopped practically 
at the moment of the impact. 
With these facts in mind, we will now examine the. testi-
mony of the ·plaintiff Viar. He states that he had been driv-
ing a motorcycle about a year, and on the occasion in ques-
tion was proceeding along· ~fain Street in a northerly diree-
. tion about fifteen miles an hour. He states that there are 
two white lines indicating the place for pedestrians to walk 
in on Ninth Street. As to 'vhat actually happened, he made 
numerous conflicting statements. vV e shall endeavor to look 
upon his testimony in its most favorable aspect to him. 
He states that there is a distance of seven feet from the 
.second white line to the parking line in which Wright was 
parked; that as he came along he was looking in front of 
him. His first statement was simply to the effect that he did 
not see any signal given by the operator of the automobile. 
(R., p. 30.) He reaffirmed this sta.tcn1ent on cross examina-
tion (R., p. 38), and incidentally ren1arked that the antomo-
pile was painted a cream color and that it would ordinarily 
be much easier to see this type of car than the customary col-
. ors of blue and black. We will endeavor to show that this 
must of necessity (in view of his other statmnents) be the 
correct account of the accident. When questioned by the 
Court he seems to recant on this statement (R., pp. 38-39). 
However, in his exan1ination by the Court, it seems apparent 
as to what he means, which is to the effect that as he was 
.crossing the second line the car pulled out in front of him, 
but that the automobile had had time to pull twelve or fif-
teen feet out into the street. This follows for the reason that 
he stated unqualifiedly that the first tim·e he saw the car it 
was moving. This will be elaborated at length later. An-
other very pertinent fact appeared from his testimony, when 
questioned by the Court, which was that travelling at the 
.speed at which he was travelling (fifteen miles an hour) he 
could have stopped his ear within a distance of ten or twelve 
~eet. Notwithstanding this admission, he states positively 
(R., 40), that he did not put on the brakes and that he did 
not swerve to the right or left to avoid the a-ccident. The most 
·significant fact, however, in his entire testimony is that he 
was not looking at ca.rs 01~ the ·side of hi1n a.t aU. To quote 
this testimony verbati1n (R., 44) : · 
. "Q. Let me get that straight. I understood yon to state 
that when you first saw the car it was moving, is that right 1 
, "A. Yes, sir. When I first saw the car it ~vas headed out 
in the street. · 
'-
----------
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'' Q. I will as}r you this question : If the signal had been 
given 1Jefore the car ever started moving isn't it possible you 
wouldn't have seen it? 
''A. I could have seen it if he had given a signal. I was 
looking in front of me. · 
- '' Q. You said the first time you saw the car was when it 
started moving. Why didn't you see it before tha.t timeY 
''A. I was lookin,q in front of ·me. I wasn't looking at the 
cars on the side I was lookin.r; in front of me. 
'' Q. You were not lookin,q at the ca1·s on the side? 
-"A. No, sir." , 
It, therefore, affirmatively appears that he would not have 
seen the signal if one had been given. This conclusion is ab-
solutely inescapable. We will examine this phase of the case 
and its implications with some care. However, before· so 
doing we wish in the interest of clarity to effectively dispose 
of the case on the theory that the plaintiff gave ·a correct ac-
count of the accident when he said h.e did not see a;ny signal! 
Viewing the case on this theory, the case of course clearly 
fails for the reason that the positive, clear and convincing 
testimony of the defendants' driver is to the effect that he 
got in the a~ttomobile, opened up the side door, looked back, 
saw nothing, gave his signal, and proceeded to pull out into 
the traffic; that after he had gotten straight in the street or 
parallel with the car track he heard the crash in the rear of 
his car. (R., 54, et seq.) Under these circumstances, the fa~ 
miliaT rule of law as expressed by this Court in White vs. 
Souther'J~ Railway Co., 151 Va. 302, 144 S. E. 424, is ap-
plicable. 
''.A. reference to the generally. accepted 111le as to positive 
and negative testimony is appropriate and helpful. · 
''Riely, J., in Souther,n, Ry. Co. vs. Bryant's Admr., 95 Va. 
215, 28 S. E. 183, thus clearly summarizes the rule: 'It is 
consonant with reason and human experience that the posi-
tive testimony of a single witness, whose credibility is un-
impeached,. that he saw or heard a particular thing at a par-
ticular time and place, onght ordinarily to outweigh that of 
a number of equally credible witnesses, who, with the same 
opportunities, testify that they did not see.nor hea.r it. The 
particular thing might hav-e taken place, and yet from inat-
tention they may not have seen nor heard it, or, though con-
scious of seeing or hearing it at the moment of its occur-
rence, may have afterwards forgotten it from lapse of tim~ 
or defective memory. In such case, the evidence of the one 
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witness is positive, while that of the many is merely negative. 
But where a witness, who denies a fact in question, had as 
good opportunity to see or hear it as he who affirms it, and 
his attention, because of special circumstances, was equally 
drawn to the matter controverted, the general rule that the 
witness who affirms a fact is . to be believed rather than he 
who denies it does not hold good. The denial ·of the one in 
such ease constitutes positive evidence as well as the af-
firmance of the other, and produces a conflict of testimony.' 
.He then proceeds to analyze and classify the testimony of 
the witnesses in that case. Referring to one, he said that his 
testimony was simply 'that he did not hear the whistle. He 
mentioned no circumstances to show that he was listening 
for it, or that there was anything to direct his attention spe-
cially to it. His evidence upon this point was merely nega-
tive, ®zd may be left out of consideration'." 
Continuing, the Court said: 
''The rule and its qualifications are well stated in 10 R. ·C. 
_L., pages 1010 to 1012, inclusive. Quoting and paraphrasing 
therefrom freely, it may be said generally that the testimony 
of a witness who does not deny 'it but merely states tha.t he 
did not know of, or has no recollection of, an ooourrance, is 
not of the same probative value as the testimony of a witness 
that he was giving attention and that no such occurrence took 
place.'' 
• • • 
'' "' • • Substantial conflicts in testimony must be submitted 
to a jury, but where there is no real conflict, juries should 
decide questions of fact in accordance witli the testimony 
submitted. The plaintiff has clearly failed to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that defendant's servants failed 
to sound the requisite statutory signals, whereas the defend-
ant has shown without substantial contradiction that these 
signals 'vere given. There is no evidence to support the ver':' 
d~ct and it is against the evidence.'' 
We respectfully submit tha.t view upon the theory that the 
plaintiff simply saw no signal, there could not possibly be a 
recovery. 
--- ---~--- ~------· 
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WAS THE ALLEGED F .AlLURE: TO GIVE- THE SIGNAL 
TH.E PROXIMATE .CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT! 
T Jet us now for a moment view the case on the theory -tba t 
no sig'llal was in fact given. Counsel for the petitioners took 
the, position in the trial court and most earnestly contend 
here that even assuming that the ddv:er of the defendants' 
car failed to give a signal, his failure in this particular could 
not under the facts and circumstances of this case have been 
the proximate cause of the accident. We will address our-
selves to this question with some care. Of course, it is well 
settled in Virginia that the violation of a statute, while it 
may or may not constitute negligence, gives no basis for a 
cause of action unless the violation thereof proximately 
caused the accident complained of. This principle was first 
settled in the well-considered case of So~tthern Railway Cont-
pa;ny vs. V atUghan, 118 Va. 692. In tha.t case, a chauffeur 
operating an automobile for hire was killed at a grade cro,ss-
ing by the plaintiff in error. It appeared that he did not 
have the necessary licenses required by law, and that the 
statute in Virginia declared that it should be unlawful for any 
person to operate any automobile in the absence of comply-
Ing with the provisions of the statute. In a well-considered 
opinion by Keith, P., the Court holds that there was no· causal 
relation between the violation of the statute and the wrong for 
which the suit was brought, and for that reason the defense 
was not a meritorious one. 
This has been reaffirmed in a long line of cases, of which 
Bassett d!; Co. vs. Wood, 146 Va. 654, is an example. There 
the Court said: 
. "Jt is settler.l law in Virginia tha,t the violation of an or-
dinance or sta.tute does not ma.ke the viola,tor guilty of neg-
ligence for which damages may be recovered ~tnless the act 
·was the 11roximate cat~se of the in.htry. The doctrine in that 
_Tespect being that the law regards the i1nmedia,te or proximate 
cause which directly produces the injury, and not the remote 
·cause which may have antecedently contributed to it. In or-
'der for the negligence of the party violating the ordinance to 
-be contributory or concurring it must have some immediate 
causal connection, or be the proximate cause of the injury.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
. -
' 
:. See also The Relation of Criminal Statute to Tort Liability: 
46 Harv. Law Rev. 453. 
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It is always ineun1bent upon the plaintiff to show that tlw 
alleged breach of duty 'vas the proximate cause of the in-
jury complained of. The leading cases in Virginia on this 
subject are Folkes vs. So. Ry. Co., 96 Va. 742; C. <t 0. Ry. 
Co. vs. Wills, 111 ·va. 32; Doss vs. Town of Big Stone GazJ, 
145 Va. 520; Grego·ry vs. Lehigh Centent Co., 157 Va. 545. 
In Judy vs. Doyle, 13Q Va. 392, the Court says: 
. "It is the province of the co~trt to detennine in the first 
instance whether or not the facts off e1·ed in. evidence, tertdin[l 
to prove an inju1·y to a pla.int-ijf, are too 1·e1note from the de-
fendoot 's act of negligence, to constitu,te an eletnent of the 
plaintiff's recove1-y." (Italics ours.) · 
. Bearing these principles in mind, the conclusion seems in-
escapable tl1at the failure of the defendants' driver to give 
a signal, even assuming that such a failure occurred, could 
not possibly have been the proximate cause of the injury, 
for the following reasons: 
The position of the automobile after the accident is undis-
puted, that is to say, that it had pulled from its stand still 
position out into the street, continued on a distance of ap-
})roximately twenty-four feet, during w!hich time it ha~ 
t?traightened itself and was parallel with the car tracks. It 
was at this time. that the motorcycle of the plaintiff ran into 
the rear of the autmnobile. It at once becomes apparent that 
the failure to· give a signal eould not possibly have proxi-
mately contributed to the injury. Continue the matter fur-
ther and its absurdity becomes patent. Sttt1Jpose the car had 
gone a half a block up the street. Coulcl it possibly be sai,z 
that the defendant yet owed the du.ty to give a si_qnalP The 
fact is that the automobile was directly in front of the plain-
tiff and had been for a considerable distance. It could not 
be contended· that, even assuming the driver had failed. to 
give the statutory signal before making his movement, that 
th_e operator of .the motorcycl~ could nevertheless run blindly 
into the rear of the automobile and then have the defendants 
respond in damages . 
. The ·most important consideration, however, is the plain-
tiff's own admission (R., 44) that he· was not looking· at the 
cars on the side at all. Of· course, the Motor Vehicle Law, 
and the dictates of common sense give the operator of a. ve-
hicle parked on the side of a street the right to move out into 
oncoming traffic, provided he complies with the la'v applieable 
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thereto, which is that he shall make his signal before start-
ing from his standstill position of his intention to so move.· 
Of course, the purpose of this is to warn approaching ve-
hicles. The plaintiff by his bold admission has stated that he 
was not looking for cars on the side. The car (a cream col-
ored one) was immediately in front of him. It seems hardly 
believable that he could have failed to see it. If he was no~ 
looking, he of course would not have seen any signal which 
rna;y have been g·iven. The Motor 'r ehicle La'v placed the bur-
den upon him of operating his motorcycle at all times in ~ 
careful and prudent manner, 'vith due regard for the condi-
tions then existing. Section 2154 (109). The duty was .also 
upon him to drive his vehicle so as to keep the same under 
co1nplete control. Of course, it goes without saying that it 
was necessary for him to keep at all times a proper lookout. 
As we have stated before, the burden rests upon the plain-
tiff to prove, first, that the defendant has breached some duty 
owed to him and that such breach of duty was the proximate 
cause of the injury. This he has clearly failed to do, in that 
he has failed to establish that the alleged negligence in any 
way pro~imately contributed to the injury. When. the plain-
tiff makes the unequivocal statements that (1) he was not 
looking at ears on the side and (2) that when he first saw 
the ear of the defendants it was mov:ing, then it becomes 
equally consi.f)tent 'With thP.- proven facts that the defendants' 
driver could have fully complied, and in fact did comply with 
the law before being struck by the plaintiff. 
In this connection, we think that the recent case of Penn-
sylvania R. Co. vs. Chamberlain, 77 L. Ed. 503, is particularly 
appropriate and applicable. In an excellent opinion the Su-
preme Court of the United States says: · 
''We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of cases 
where proven facts give equal· support to each of two incon-
sistent inferences; in 'which e1.'ent, neither of them being es-
tablished, judgtnent, as a matter of lOAv, 'ln'ttst go a,gainst the 
pat·t:ll upon whom res.ts the necessity of sustainin.q one of 
these in/et·ences as a.qainst the other, before he is ent·itled 
to recover.'' • • • 
''And the desired inference is precluded for the further 
reason that respondent's right of recovery depends upon the 
existence of a particular fact which must be inferred from 
proven facts, and this is not permissible in the face of the 
positive atnd otherwise 'lt'lzcontradicted testimony of wnirn.-
peached 'UJ'itnesses consistent with the facts actually proved 
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fi'tnn, which testimony it affirrnatively appears that the fact 
sought to be inferred did not e~ist. '' 
The only inference to be drawn from the plaintiff's testi-
mony is either that the plaintiff was operating his motor-
cycle along the street at a reckless rate of speed, or that he 
failed to keep· the lookout prescribed by law. In either of 
tl1e last events, his case would fail on the ground that he him-
self was guilty of contributory negligence, irrespectiv:e of 
any primary negligence of the plaintiff. Thi~ mus.t of ne-
cessity be true by his own statement. ·It appeared that he 
could have stopped his motorcycle at the speed at which he 
was travelling in a distance of within ten or twelve feet. He 
had considerably more than this distance and he failed either 
to stop his motorcycle or undertake to effectively avoid the 
~onsequences of the accident. He cannot abandon himself en-
tirely to the care of others. 
THE STATUTE IN QUE.STION. 
Another very engaging aspect of the case at bar, which 
bears upon the question of whether or not the defendants' al-
~eged negligence was the proxi~ate cause of the injury, may 
pe set out as follows: 
The statute re.ferr'ed to (~Se·ction 2154 (122)) provide·S in 
part "tha't every dri-ver who intends to start, stop or turn, 
etc., * * ·:+ shall give a signal as required in this section''. · 
Upon a reference to the plaintiff Via.r 's testimony it wil1 be 
found that he states (R., 43) : 
"A. No, sir. It came out like this and I hit him right in 
there. (Indicating.) 
"Q. When you first saw the car it was 'moving? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. The first time you, s~w it? 
"A. Part of it was ~n the street., 
The testimony of the defendants' driver is not at all in con-
.flict with this statement for the reason that he· states (R., 
54): 
"A. There was a car in :front or me. I got in my car, put 
my packages in, held out my hand with the door open, looked 
back like this (indicating), and backed on back. 
''Q. Looking back while you 'vere backing! 
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"A. Yes, sir, and holding the door open. I closed the door, 
held out my hand and came out of the parking space like 
this and came in front of this car here.'' · 
If is, therefore, apparent that the plaintiff could have and 
so far as this record shows, did comply with the statu,tory 
d'U.ty· before pullin,q out into traffic. It was, of course, the 
duty of the plaintiff Viar to keep a lookout, not only for cars 
imm~diately in front of him, but for cars parked on his right 
(which of course would he in front of him), which under the 
law had the right to come into the traffic upon giving the 
proper signal. This is significant as showing that the proxi-
mate cause of the injury could not ha:ve be-en the driver 
Wright's alleged failure to give the signal required. 
· While we feel, as the late C. J. Prentis remarked in the 
White case, supra, that "Proximate cause is deep and muddy 
water into which many men wise and otherwise have ven-
tured'', that it is too plain to admit of serious controversy 
that the alleged failure could not have been .the ,proximate 
cause here. ·As we have pointed out, it is not only incunl-
bent upon the plaintiff to prove the violation of the statute, 
but also to prov:e· tha.t this violation proximately caused or 
contributed to the accident. This principle has had most fre-
quent recognition in Virginia, in railroad cases. In Norfolk-. 
SouJhern R. Co. vs. Banks, 141 Va. 715, at page 721, in deal-
ing with the Code Section requiring railroads to sound the 
statutory sig·nal, the Court says: 
. ''While section 3959 of the Code provides for a recovery 
when the defendant has not blown the whistle, and rung· the 
bell as therein required, even though the plaintiff is guilty 
of negligence in attempting to cross the track in front of an 
approaching train, this must be read in the light of the uni-
versal principle of la,v, that no negligence of the defendant, 
ho,vever gross, can sustain a verdict for the plaintiff unless 
that particular negligence contributed to the injury.''. 
"There must be some causal connection between the failure 
of the defendant to observe the statutory requirement$ aiH.l 
the injury suffered by the plaintiff." 
This principle is affirmed in Gregory vs. Seaboard Air Line. 
Ry. Co., 142 Va. 750, ·128 S. E. 272; N. tt lV. Ry. Co. vs. Macf', 
151 Va. 458, 145 S. E. 362; Southen~ R. Co. vs Johns, J51' 
Va. 345, 143 S'. E .. 887. . . . 
.. A pertinent case dealing with automobiles is. Rya·n vs~ 
Trenkle (Iowa), 212 N. W. 888. That was a case in which 
an autmnobile proceeding along a north and south street was~ 
in collision with a bicycle approaching from the opposite di-
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rection. The automobile undertook to mal{e a lefthand turn, 
when the two v:ehicles came together. The allegation of neg-
ligence was the failure of the automobile driver to give the 
signal required by law. The statute was practi~.ally identic.al 
with the Virginia statute. The Court said: 
"Was the failure, if any, of the driver of the automobile 
to give the statutory or other warning signals a proximate 
~ause of the injury claimed~ It is ·elementary that negligence 
may not be predicated on the failure to give signals when 
such failure in no wise can be sa.id to be the proximate cause 
of the injury. Schttltz vs. Starr, 180 Iowa 1319, 164 N. vV. 
163; Bisha-rd vs. Engelbeck, 180 Iowa 1132, 164 N. W. 203; 
Pixler vs. Clentens, 195 Iowa 529, 191 N. W. 375. 
"A person who has knowledge of the pres~nc.e of a train 
or auto which imparts to him the very thing that a signal was 
intended to impart cannot, under ordinary circumstances, 
predicate negligence on the failure to give a signal. The 
undisputed evidence in this case is to the effect that the auto 
was upon the street intersection making· the turn to the west, 
while the boy on the bicycle was approaching the street inter-
section from the north. 
''Section 5032, Code 1924, provides : 
'The operator of a n1otor v:ehicle shall, before e * * turn-
ing or changing· the course of such vehicle, * * "' give a visible 
or audible signal to the crossing officer, if there be such, or 
to the drivers of vehicles following, of his intention to make 
such movement. * * * . ' 
"The plaintiff's ward, under the instant facts, was not a 
person within the statutory classification. See l'Vestlund vs. 
I vet·son, et al., 154 l\Hnn. 52, 191 N. W. 253; Eve-rett vs. G·reat 
l\7 orthern Railway Co., 100 Minn. 309, 111 N. Vv. 281, 9 L. It 
A. (N. S.) 703, 10 Ann. Cas. 294. 
· "Plaintiff's ward was not exposed to injury because of 
any lack of statutory signal, if one was not given, nor does 
any rule of common law bring the def<mdants within the duty 
claimed by plaintiff. It cannot be said that the alleged fail-
ure to give a signal had any causative and proximate rela-
tion to the collision and the resulting damages.'' 
· This case is particularly pertinent to the case at bar. The 
plaintiff states that the automobile in question was a cream 
:Colored· car and could therefore be seen better than an auto-
mobile of the usual and customary color, that when he first 
saw it, it was moving out into the street. His explanation 
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of not having seen it before is one which we ha:ve dwelt on 
before, to-wit, that he was not looking at cars on the side 
of the street (although they would have been practically in 
his direct path of travel). When the plaintiff says that he 
first saw it when it was nwving out in the street, he makes it 
clear that the driver could have complied with his statutory 
duties before the accident. 
The young plaintiff was at a sufficient distance to have 
permitted him to bring his motorcycle to a stop. This hC! 
did ·not do, nor did he undertake to even so much as swerve 
his motorcycle in an effort to avoid the accident. We think 
this would clearly bring him within that class of case which 
holds that an operator of an automobile on the highway, who 
operates his automobile at such a speed as not to enable him 
to stop within -the range of vision of his lights, is guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law. See Weston vs. So. Ry. Co. 
(N. C.), 139 S. E. 237; Belch vs. Independent Coal Co. (N. 
C.), 150 S. E. 717; Nikaluopolas vs. Ramsey (Utah), 214 Pac. 
304. See also 58 A. L. R. 1493. 
THE CONTRffiUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
While we feel that we have dwelt upon this feature suffi. 
eiently in discussing the other points heretofore adverted to, 
we confidently assert that the cause of the accident was the 
negligence of the plaintiff in the oper~ tion of his motorcycle 
along the street. Assuming that the driver failed to give a 
signal when he started from his standstill position, the plain-
tiff's action in running head on into the rear of the auto-
mobile was the intervening, independent, self-operating 
cause, which brought about the accident. In Folkes vs. So. 
Ry. Go., 96 Va. 742, the Court says: 
· "It is not only requisite that damage, actual or inferential 
should be suffered, hut this damage must be the legitimate 
sequence of the thing amiss. The maxim of the law here ap-
plicable is that in law the immediate and not the remote cause 
.of any event is regarded. • • e In other words, the law always 
refers the injury to the proximate, not to the remote cause. 
• 
8 
• If an injury has resulted in consequence of a certain 
wrongful act or omission, but only through or by means of 
some intervening cause, from which last cause the injury 
followed as a direct and immediate consequence, the law will 
refer the damage to the last or proximate cause, and refuse 
to trace. it to that which is more remote. $ >~ >~ • '' 
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This principle has been reaf.firmed in· "Case aftet case in 
Virginia. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Assignments of error numbered 2 and 3 relate to · the 
Court's error in giving plaintiff's Instruction 2, and in re-
fusing defendants' instruction ·C. The objection to instruc-
tion 2 was on the ground, which we have heretofore treated, 
to-wit, that there· was no evidence to warrant the giving of 
the instruction. The action of the Court in refusing de-
fendants' instruction C likewise relates to matters alreadv 
covered. It sought to have the jury told that if they believed 
froni the evidence that the car operated by Wright had pulled 
from the curbing and gotten approximately straight in the 
atreet when the plaintiff struck it, then the said Wright would 
have been guilty of no negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the accident, whether he gave or failed to give the 
signal required by law. Had the Court given this instruc-
tion, it would of necessity hav:e resulted in the Court having 
to set aside the verdict. This question has been likewise care-
fully considered, and no necessity exists for reiterating .here. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, counsel for the petitioner most earnestly 
and respectfully submit that upon any fair consideration of 
the evidence, viewing the same in its most favorable aspect to 
the plaintiff, no negligence has been proven which would en-
title the plaintiff to a verdict and judgment. To permit a plain-
tiff to operate his motorcycle in the manner in which this 
plaintiff has obviously operated his, to-wit, to run blindly 
along the Main Street of a city without regard for automo-
biles parked along the side, who hav:e a legitimate right to 
move into traffic, and then make the driver of the automo-
bile respond in damages when he runs head-on into him, on 
a shadowy theory that prior to that time no signal was given 
of his intention to move into traffic, is a plain travesty of 
justice, which impinges upon the universal principle that he 
who undertakes to hold another liable in damages must him-
self be free from negligence. 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas may be awarded to the judgment of the Circuit 
Court for th~ ·City of Lynchburg, a.nd that the said judgment 
may be reversed and annulled, and this Court under the stat-
ute in such cases made and provided proceeding to enter such 
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judgment as appears right and proper; shall enter :fina~ judg-
ment for your petitioners. . , 
A copy -of this p~tition was in p_t1rs~1ance of Rule 2 of this 
Court as amended, delivered to Basil G. Watkins, counsel 
for the plaintiff, on the 12th day of July, 1933. · 
Counsel for petitioners desire to state· orally- their reasons 
why· the writ prayed for should be ·granted, and so advise tliC 
Court. in order that seasonable opporturiity may be allowed 
for same. · 
· Respec~fully, 
L. C. WRIGHT AND F. L. FORBES, 
Trading as Piedmont Cafe .. 
By CASKIE, FROST AND ·COLEMAN, . 
Attorneys: 
We, the undersigned attorneys, practicing· in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in· our opin-
ion the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition 
should be reviewed. · · 
JAS. R. CASI{IE, 
E. MARSHALL FROST, 
PAUL H. COLEMAN. 
Received J nly 17, 1933. 
M. B. ~w .. 
September 25, 1933. Writ of error and supersedeas 
awarded by the .Court. Bond $500.00. 
Received September 29, 1933. 
1YI. B. W .A.T'TIS, Clerk ... 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Don P. I-Ialsey, Judge of the 
circuit court of the city of Lynchburg on the 1st day of 
April, 1933, and in the 157th year of the Comn1onwealth. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 3rd day 
.of February, 1933, Kirby E. Viar by J. E. Viar, his next 
~riend, by B. G. Watkins, Esquire, his attorney, caused to 
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])e ·returned to the clerk's office of the circuit court of the 
city of Lynchburg his notice of motion for judgment for 
money, ag·ainst L. C. Wright and F. L. Forbes, trading as 
Piedmont Cafe, which said notice had theretofore been duly 
served on said defendants. 
Said notice of motion for judgment for money is in the 
. words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDG~iENT. 
To L~ c: Wright and F. L. Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe: 
· Take notice that I, J{irby E. Viar, by my next friend, J. E. 
·viar, will on the 19th day of ~larch, 1933, at 10 o'clock ... ~. lL, 
being the first day of the ]\{arch term of the Circuit Qourt of 
the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, or as soon thereafter as I 
may be heard, move the said court for judgment against you 
and each of you jointly and severally in the sum of Twenty-
five hundred ($2,500) Dollars damag;es for personal injuries 
"\Vhich I sustained as the proximate result of your negligence 
on or about the 7th day of January, 1933, in the following 
manner, to-wit: that heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 7th 
day of January, 1933, in the City of L~nchburg, Virginia, I 
wa~ riding· a ce.rtain motorcycle on and along l\{ain Street 
and traveling in a northwesterly direction thereon at a mod-· 
erate and lawful rate of speed; that I had-crossed the in-
tersection of 9th and J\tlain Streets and was proceeding along 
~fain Street a few feet. from the intersection aforesaid at a-
moderate and lawful rate of speed, when suddenly, and with-
out any warning, a certain Ford sedan automobile, then and 
there being driven and operated by the defendant, L. C. 
Wright, who at said time was acting as the agent, servant, 
and employee of the defendant, F·. L. Forbes, trading as 
Piedmont Cafe, and within the scope of his duties as su<~h 
agent, servant, and employee of the said defendant, F~ L. 
Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe, which was 
page 3 ~ parked near the curbing- on l\iain Street and on the 
righthand side thereof proceeding in the direction 
which I was traveling, was negligently and carelessly, and 
'vithout any warning- or signal, operated and driven -by the 
defendant, L. C. Wright as aforesaid, from said curbi:og out 
into the line of traffic in which I was proceeding on said 
street and dire·ctly in front of the motorcy~le on which I was 
ridi:ng, thereby causing- said Ford automobile to collide with 
the motorcycle on which I was riding and thereby causing 
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said Ford automobile with great force and violence to strike 
my body and particularly one of my legs, thereby w9unding, 
cutting·, lacerating, bruising·, and otherwise injuring the 
muscles, tendons, nerves, flesh and bones of one of my said 
legs in and about the knee joint thereof, cutting a deep wound 
in said knee from one side to the other of my said leg, which 
said wound is several inches in length, and otherwise in-
juring and shocking me in my physical body and nerves, and · 
thereby causing me to suffer severe and excruciating pain 
and mental torture, and further causing me to have to un-
dergo treatment in the hospital for some days, and further 
causing me to be forced to remain in bed for some time and· 
thereby to be unaple to work and to follow my usual voca_-
tion, and further causing me to be put to great expense for 
doctors' bills and medical attention and, as I am advised, 
probably causing said knee joint to be permanently 
page 4 ~ stiff and painful and thus p~rmanently causing me 
to be maimed and injured, all as a direct and proxi-
mate result of your negligence which is set forth more par-
ticularly as follows: 
That you and each of you were negligent, in that you, the 
defendant, L. ·C. Wright, through yourself, and the said de-
fendant, F. L. Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe, through 
your servant, agent and employee, L. C. Wright as afore-
said, operated said automobile in a reckless, careless and 
negligent manner in that you drove said motor vehicle out 
from said curbing where same was parked and into the line 
of traffic in which I was proceeding along said street and 
directly in· front of the motorcycle on which I was riding 
without having given any signal or warning as required by 
law in such cases made and provided, and further without 
keeping a proper lookout for traffic proceeding· along Main 
Street in the line of traffic into which you drove· said car, 
and further in that you drov:e and operated said automobile 
from one line of traffic into and across another line of traffic 
on said street without giving any signal or warning, without 
keeping a proper lookout and without first using o.rdinary 
care to see whether said movement could be made with saf~ty 
to yourself and other persons using the line of traffic in 
which I was pro.ceeding, and in that you further failed and 
neglect~d to give a proper signal of your intention to tui·n 
from said curbing into and across said line of traf.fic 
page 5 ~ in which I was riding, in time for me to avoid n. col-
lision with said automobile, and further in that you 
drove and operated said automobile from said curbing into 
the line of traffic in which I was proceeding and directly in 
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front of the motoreycle on which I was riding, with sueh sud-
denness and speed as to eollide with the motorcycle on which 
I was riding without affording me any opportunity of ascer-
taining the movement of the said automobile in time to pre-
vent said collision, all of which acts of negligence were the 
proximate and direct causes of the injuries sustained by me 
as aforesaid. And, therefore, I institute this said aetion 
for the sum of Twenty-five hundred ($2,500) Dollars for said 
injuries sustained by me as the result of your negligence as 
aforesaid. · 
Given under my hand· this 1st day of February, i933. , . 
KIRBY E. VIAR, 
B·y his next friend, J. E. Viar. 
By B. G. WATKINS, Counsel. 
B. G. WATI{INS, p. q. 
At another day, tQ-wit, at Lynchburg circuit court, ·March 
20th, 1933. 
. This day came the parties by their attorneys, and on mo-
tion of the plaintiff it is ordered tha.t this motion be dock-
eted. And on the further motion of said plaintiff it is ordered 
that the defendants do file a statement of the grounds of 
their defense. · 
page 6 ~ GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendants rely upon the following as their defense 
to the above action. 
1. That they deny each and every one of the negligent acts 
eharged in the notice of motion. 
2. That they were not guilty of any negligence which was · 
a proximate cause of the accident. · 
3. That the negligence of Kirby E. Viar in respects as set 
out in No. 4 below was the proximate cause of the accident. 
4. If the defendants should be deemed guilty of negligenc~, 
which negligenee they deny, the defendants expressly rely on 
the contributory negligence of K:irby m. Viar in that. (a) 
Kirby E. Viar was not driving at a careful speed, having due 
regard to· the traffic, surface and 'vidth of the highway and 
of any other conditions then existing; (b) That the said 
Kirby E. Viar was d1·iving his motorcycle in an unlawful 
manner, in that the same was not under his complete control, 
as required by law; (c) That Kirby E. Viar saw, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have seen the automobile 
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driven by L. C. Wright in ample time to avoid the accident._ 
The defendants will rely upon any defense permissible un-
der their plea to the general ·issue, and reserve the right .to 
amend or modify the foregoing grounds of defense in any par-
. ticular. · · 
F. L. FORBES, 
L. C. WRIGHT, 
By L. B~ WATERS and 
CASKIE, FROST & COLE~fAN. 
pag~ 7 ~ SPECIAL PLEA· AND AFFIDAVIT. 
The said defendant, F. L. Forbes,. comes and says that the 
~wtice of motion for judgment· in this case alleges that L. C. 
Wright in the notice of tnotion for judgment mentioned, was, 
at the time of the alleged injury in the notice of motion for 
judgment mentioned, operating a Ford sedan- automobile as 
the agent, servant and employee of this def"endant, the said 
F. L.- Forbes, trading as· Piedmont Cafe, and that the said 
L. C. Wright was acting· in the scope of his duties as the 
said agent, servant and employee of the said defendant, F. L. 
Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe, at the time of the alleged 
injury complained of-all of which this defendant specificaJly 
denies. 
And for further denial states that the said L. C. Wright 
was not operating the said automobile as the agent, servant 
or employee of this defendant, F. L. Forhes, trading as· Pied-
mont Cafe, and that this defendant, the said F. L. Forbes, 
trading as Piedmont Cafe, did not own said automobile in 
the notice of motion for judgment mentioned, neither was 
the said L. C. Wright the agent, servant or en1ployee of this 
defendant, the said F. L. Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe. 
at the time of the said injury complained of, but, ·on the con-
trary, it is alleged that the said automobile was owned and 
operated by one, James I. Forbes, at the time of said injury 
and that the said L. C. ·Wright, at the time of the 
page 8 ~ supposed injury complained of, was the agent, serv-
ant and employee of the said James I. Forbes and 
was not the agent, servant and employee of this defendant, 
F. L. Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe. · 
Wherefore, he prays judgment whether this Court can or 
will take any further cognizance of the· said supposed cause 
of action alleged against this defendant, the said F. L. 
Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe. 
F.L.FORBES .. 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Lynchburg, to-wit: 
This day F. L. Forbes personally app~ared before me, L .. 
Bradford Waters, a Notary Public in and for the city and 
state aforesaid, in my city aforesaid, and made oath that 
the matters and things stated in the foregoing plea are true. 
Given under my hand this 31 day of ~{arch, 1933. 
L. BR.A.DFORD WATERS, 
Notary Public. 
page 9 ~ And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg cir-
cuit court, April 1st, 1933, the date first hereinbe-
fore mentioned. 
This day came the parties by th~ir attorneys, and the de-
fendants for plea. say that they are not guilty in manner and 
f.orm as the plaintiff in his notice of motion for judgment 
against them has complained, and of this they put themselves 
upon the country, and the plaintiff likewise_ And said de-
fendants filed by leave of court. a statement in writing of t11e 
grounds of their defense, to which the plaintiff replies gen-
erally, and prays that the same be inquired of by the coun-
try, and the said defendants likewise. And the said defend-
ant, F. L. Forbes, filed by leave of court his special plea and 
affidavit denying the agency set up in the plaintiff's notice 
of motion for judgment, to which the plaintiff replies gen-
erally, and prays that the same be inquired' of by the country, 
and the said defendant likewise. And said parties demand-
ing a. jury, there came a jury, to-wit, Guy A. Dirom, Ivan Fl. 
J\!fartin, C. B. 1\forris, R. D. Thornhill, Elmo M. Stone, J. 0. 
Whitten and John D. Ogleshy, who were sworn to try the is-
sue joined, and having· heard the evidence on behalf of the 
plaintiff, the said defendants by their attorneys moved tho 
court to strike out the said plaintiff's evidence on the ground 
that no neg·ligence has been shown on the part of said de-
fendants, and on the further ground that the plaintiff by 
l1is uwn testimony has shown hilnself to be guilty of contribu-
tory negligence which bars any recovery by him in this case, 
and said motion being fully argued the court doth overn1le 
the same, and the said defendants by their attorneys ex-
cepted. Thereupon the defendants' evidence being 
page 10}- heard, and the jury having heard all of the evidence, 
the said defendants by their a.ttorneyE~ renewed their 
motion to strike out all of the plaintiff's evidence, on the 
grounds above stated, which said motion the court doth over-
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rule, and the said defendants by their attorneys excepted. 
Thereupon the jury aforesaid having heard all of the evidence 
and argument of counsel, returned the following verdict, to-
wit, ''We the jury find for the plaintiff and fix his damages 
at $300.00. John ·n. Oglesby, Foreman". Thereupon the 
defendants by their attorneys mov:ed the court to set aside 
said verdict and enter up judgment for the said defendunts, 
on the ground that said verdict is contrary to the law and the 
evidence and 'vithout evidence to support it, which said mo-
tion the court overruled, and to which ruling of the court 
the said defendants by their attorneys excepted. 
It is therefore considered by the court that the plaintiff 
recover against the said defendants, L. C. Wright, and F. L. 
Forbes, trading as Piedmont Cafe, the sum of $300.00, the 
damages by the jurors in their verdict aforesaid ascertained 
and assessed, with legal interest thereon from this day until 
paid, and his costs by him about his motion in this behalf 
expended. . 
· At the instance of the defendants, who hy their attorneys 
intimated a desire to present a petition for a writ of error 
and supersedeas, it is ordered that execution of the foregoing 
judgment be suspended for a period of sixty days, provide 
that said defendants or some one for them shall execute before 
the clerk of this court a proper suspending bond in the penalty 
of $100.00, conditioned according to law. 
The evidence taken at the trial of this case, the instructions 
given and refused, etc., are in the words and figures follow-
ing, to-wit: 
page 11. ~ The witness, • i 
WM. A. FORD, 
having been fi~st duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Watkins : 
Q. lVIr. Ford, I believe you are the Deputy Commissioner 
of the Revenue. Are you not Y 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have a record there of the issues of licences to the 
Piedmont Cafe and the Shen·noodoah Cafe? 
A. We have no record of either the Piedmont or the Shen~ 
na.ndoah ·Ca.fe. We issue licenses under the City ordin~nce. 
They are applied for before the Judge of the Municipal Court 
and we issue them in accordance with permits that come b'ack 
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to us and the Piedmont and the Shenandoah neither one show 
on our books at all. 
By 1\fr. Waters: We admit that F. L. Forbes owns the Pied-
mont and Shenna;ndoah Cafes. 
By Mr. Frost: We admit that. 
page 12} The witness, 
G. L. BOBBITT, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRE.CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Watkins: 
Q. Mr. Bobbitt, it is alleged here that on January 7th there 
was a collision between a motorcycle driven by Kirby E. 
Viar and a car being operated by Mr. L. C. Wright at the 
corner of 9th, or about the· corner· of 9th and Main Streets. 
Will you please state whether you were present at that time7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you standing? 
A. Standing on the corner in front of Wills-Camp. 
Q. Did you see the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you describe to the jury and the Court what you 
sawY 
- A. Well, this car was parked, let's see Y I don't know ex-
actly, but about fifteen foot from the corner of 9th and Ma1n 
Streets on Wills-Camp's side and I had my eye on this Viar 
boy when he was just about at the corner there. 
Q. You mean after he had crossed the intersection of 9th 
and ·J\.fain Y 
A. Yes, sir, I had my eye on him until he hit the car. 
Q. Do you know about how far,-there is a parking line 
that comes down ~Iain Street in front of Wills-Camp's and 
cuts across making the last parking space, do you know how 
far that is from the corner? 
page 13 } A. About six or seven feet. 
Q. From the chalk line where people cross the 
street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was this car parked in the last parking space Qn Main 
Street? 
A. As well as I can remember it was. 
Q. Just go ahead and tell what you saw. 
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A. Well, the car pulled out in front of this Viar ·boy and 
hadn't fully got straightened out in the street when· the Viar 
hoy hit the rear left bumper of ~his car. . 
Q. Describe to the jury ·how this car _pulled out .of there~ 
whethe.r fast or slow, or how. · 
A. Well, I don't guess he 'vas pulling out no more than any 
other car would. 
Q. Did he.pull out from behind another c·arf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When he started to pull out·, or when he pulled. out_ fron1 
behind that car there, where was the boy when his car first 
w~nt out of the lane of the cars parked there into the lane 
of traffic where he was f 
A. He was on the corner. 
Q. About the corner in about ten or fifteen feet from it1 
:A. Yes, sir, that is 1ight. · · · . 
Q. Did you see how fast the boy was driving the 
page 14 ~ motorcycle? 
A: I don't guess over six or seven miles an hour. 
Q .. Y ori say at a moderate rate of speed. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the boy have a chance to turn his motorcycle or 
avoid running into tile car f 
A. No, sir. Another one was coming down on the other 
side of the street. 
- Q. Did the boy have any chance to stop the motorcycle 
before running into the car in that distance? 
. A. I don't know. I never rode a motorcycle and don't 
know how quick yon can stop one. 
Q. It was no more than ten or fifteen feet from where he 
first started to pull out until he hit him¥ 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
By the Court: 
Q. Where did the boy come fro1n f 
A. From towards 12th St. and Main. 
Q. Did he cross 9th Street with the motorcycle f 
A. Yes, sir, he had gotten under the stop light and when 
I ~een him he was about at the corner there. 
Q. Had he passed the stop light when the car started out' 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Mr. Watkins (Continues): . 
Q .. You say he was about a.t the corner when the automobile 
started out' 
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page 15 ~ .A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Go ahead and describe what else you sa'v 
after he hit. What happened then 1 
.A. We ran out there and picked up the boy and put him in 
a car and carried him to the hospital. ~Ir. Burruss came and 
got the witnesses. · • 
Q. Was be knocked unconscious 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't see the leg injury, did you? 
.A. Yes, sir, I saw it at the hospital. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Wright give any signal? 
.A. No, sir, I was on the other side of the car. 
Q. On the other side of the car 7 
A. Yes, sir." 
Q~ Did you see him look back down tl1e street, or did you 
see him before he got in the car at all¥ 
A. No, sir, I didn't see 1\Ir. Wright. I just seen the auto-
mobile. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By ~Ir. ·Coleman: 
Q. 1\fr. Bobbitt, I understand you were standing on the cor-
ner there in front of Wills-Camp Company. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you stated that the motorcycle was running about 
seven or eight miles an hour 7 
.A. Yes, sir. 
page 16 ~ Q. Six or seven? 
.A. Yes, sir, or eight. I don't know exactly. 
Q. You ever drive a motorcycle? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think one can stand up running six or seven 
miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Within what distance do you think you could bring a 
motorcycle to a stop driving a.t six or seven miles an hour? 
A. Ten foot anyhow. · 
Q. You don't think you could stop it in any less than ten 
feet? 
.A. I- don't kno,v· about that. 
Q. From your statement I understood you to say that at 
the time the car pulled out this boy, Kirby Viar, was about 
:fifteen feet from him 1 
A. That is right. . 
Q. I will ask you to tell the jury what was to prevent Kirby 
Viar from bringing his motorcycle to a stop. 
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A. I don't know what could have prevented it. _ _ 
Q. You don't know anything tha.t could have prevented it? 
A. No, sir, all I know is that he couldn't have gotten around 
that car because there was another car coming down the 
street. , 
Q. As I understand you to say, Mr. Bobbitt, you can't. 
tell the jury any reason why, if this boy was travel-
page 17 } ing at six or seven miles an hour he couldn't have 
· stopped the motorcycle. 
A. That is right. 
Q. You don't know f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You state that the automobile operated by Wright had 
·gotten practically straight out in the street f 
A. Practically. E:e hadn't fully got straightened out. 
Q. Had not gotten fully straightened out, but was approxi-
mately. You testified it started out from this standstill 
position just as anybody else does Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You could see no difference in the manner he started 
and the manner anybody else starts 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I will ask_ you this : How far 'do you think he traveled 1 
You say he had gotten practically straightened ou_t. How far· 
do you think he had traveled from his standstill position to 
the point where he was struck by this motorcycle Y 
A. About eight feet or nine feet. 
Q. The car is much longer than eight feet or nine feet, 
isn't itY 
A. I guess it was about twelve feet. 
Q. In order to get practically straightened out from a 
standstill position, as I understand it-(Demon-
page 18 ~ strat1ng with. toy automobiles). Take this little 
car here and call this Main Street~ In order to~ 
get straightened out he has got to pull from the curb and get 
in a position similar to this. 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. He hds got to leave a standstill position and get in that 
position! 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did I understand you to say the boy struck him in 
the rear bumper Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. WlJt:tt was to prevent the boy from .going a.round the· 
car.Y 
A. There was another car coming down the other side of 
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the street and if he had run around he would have run into 
the other car. 
Q. He would have run into the other car and you don't know 
any reason why he couldn't have stopped Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know the width of Main Street there t 
.A •. No, sir. 
'Q. It is a wide street, isn't it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 19 ~ The witness, 
DR. JOHN W. DEVINE, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Watkins: 
Q. Dr. Devine, did you attend Kirby Viar on, or about, 
the 8th of January, or shortly thereafter, for an injury to 
his leg? 
A. He was admitted to the Lynchburg Hospital and I saw 
him the following morning. 
Q. Describe the wound he had to the jury. . 
A. He had, I think it was his right knee, he had a wound, 
I reckon, about four inches in length and the intern told me-
Q. (Interposing) Don·'t tell what the futern told you. 
A. I didn't measure the wound but I imagine it was about 
four inches. . 
Q. Go ahead and describe your subsequent treatment. 
A. I. dressed him' a few times in the hospital and visited 
him at his home after he left the hospital. I dressed him at 
home a couple. of times, once or twice, and then he came to the 
office several times. 
Q. About how long did you treat him, if you remember? 
A. I don't just recall. Prob~bly three or four weeks. 
Q. Some three or ·four weeks. Now, when he went back 
to work, do you know the condition of his knee when he 
went back to work f 
A. I recall he .was very anxious to get back to work and 
I let him go back a little earlier than I think he 
page 20 ~ really should have gone, but his wound was about 
· · 'healed and I think it was safe for him to go back 
to work but still rather painful for him to use his leg. 
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By the Court : 
Q. Where was this wound Y Above or below the knee t 
A. _R,ight over the knee cap. 
Q. Right over th~e knee c~p. Uow deep was it? 
A. It did not penetrate the capsule of the knee joint. I 
judged that it_ didn't. becau,se he didn't have any infection 
in the knee joint which he probably would have had had the 
\vound penetrated to the cap,s.~le. 
Q. Vertical or horizontal 1 _ 
A. Elliptical, with the ·convex portion downward and the 
flap came up. 
By Mr. Watkins: To make it clearer he can show it to you. 
Mr. Watkins (Continues): 
Q. Was it very painful, Doctor Y 
A. ·Of course a- wound any place near a joint is painful 
because it is a fact that it is rather hard to keep it straight 
and the motion of th_e leg makes it painful. 
Q. Whnt effect will it have on the use of the knee joint T 
A. I don't think it would have any permanent effect on it. 
-- Temporarily it will be stiff.· He had to keep it stiff 
page 21 ~ for a while and he had a splint on it for a while. 
CROSS- EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: 
Q. I understood you to say there would be no permanent 
injury from this accident Y 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. As a matter of fact he was discharged on January 9th, 
wasn't heY 
A. I don't remen1ber how long he was there. 
Q. I-Ie didn't stay there long, did heY 
A. Just a few days. 
The- witness stands aside. 
The witness, 
VERNON BRYANT, 
having been_ first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
- DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Watkins: 
Q. Mr. Bryant, are you in any way related to I{irby ViarY 
A. No, sir. _ · 
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Q. Were you present at the time of the collision betw~en -
a motorcycle ridden by this boy and the car operated by Mr. 
Wright about January 7th, the night of January 7th, on Main 
Streett 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 22 ~ Q. Go ahead and describe to the jury 'vhere you 
were and what you saw, if anything? 
A. Well, that night, it was on Saturday night. I was com-
ing across from the National Bank toward the Cigarette store 
on the opp_osite corner and I noticed this boy coming ou 
across where the. light is. I noticed him coming by. I noticed 
this car of E,.orbes' was parked in front of Wills-Camp's Cloth-
ing Store and this fellow shot rig·ht out and I didn't see him 
give any signal at all. He shot out and this boy ran right 
into it. . · 
Q. I believe you . said you were walking across this side 
of 1\tlain Street, from the Lynchburg National Bank to what is 
now the drug store, used to be· a cigar store. Is that right! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the boy as the motorcycle crossed over 
that intersection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At what rate of sped would you say he was traveling? 
A. He was traveling at a moderate rate of speed. He wasn't 
speeding at all. 
Q. Now, I believe the car 'vas driven by Mr. Wright. It 
is a white car, isn't it 7 
A. It seemed to be a cream colored car or something like 
that. 
Q. You saw that car parked over there in front of Wills-
Camp Co.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About where was the boy, if you know, when 
page 23 } this m~ started, Mr. Wright started to pull his 
car out of the parking place 7 What point had the 
boy reached in the street there? 
A. Well, I imagine he was about ten feet from him when he 
started to pull out. 
Q. In other words, he 'vas across the intersection of 9th 
Street? 
A. Yes, sir, across the intersection. 
Q. About ten feet of the ·rear of this cart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you looking in that direction? 
A. I was looking positively in that direction. 
Q. Could you have seen a signal if he had given one7 
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A. I could. 
Q. You say he pulled the car in front of the motorcycle T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What position was the Wright car in when it was hit 
by _the motorcycle Y 
A. It was on an angle. The boy, I am sure, was about the 
middle of the car track. . 
Q. You say the Wright car was on an anglef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What part of the car did the motorcycle hit Y 
A. I think it hit between the two doors. I don't know 
how true it is. 
Q. Did you go over there after the thing hap-
page 24 ~ pened Y · 
A. 1res, sir. · 
Q. Describe to the jury what you saw. 
A. I went over and I seen who the boy was. The boy went 
up in the air about five feet and the motorcycle with him. I 
knew who the boy was and I went to the drug store and told 
th~ druggist about it and he came down with me to see if 
it was his boy, and that is all I seen. 
Q. Did it knock this boy unconscious at the timet 
A. Yes, sir. They picked him up and put him in the car 
and ·cartied him to the hospital. · · . 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Bryant, did you stay there until the officers came 
to make investigations of this accident Y · 
A. No, sir, I went to the drug store. 
Q. You didn't stay until' the officers came Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In other words, you witnessed this thing and went on 
off. 
A. I went to tell the druggist about it up at Reynold's Drug 
Store between 8th and 7th. 
Q. Did you see a number of people standing around Y 
A. Yon mean when I came backT 
Q. I mean when this accident occurred. 
A. Yes, sir, the.re were lots of people on the street. It was · 
Saturday night. 
page 25 ~ Q. Saturday night and lots of people on the 
street. Tell the jury, Sir, to what extent this car 
·had gotten straightened out in the street. How fa.r had it 
gotten straightened out t 
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A. Well, from what I could see it was probably over a 
third of it in the street. 
Q. Over a third of it in the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You mean to sa.y it had come from a straight position 
to a point where a third of it was in the street T 
A. Well, out in the street. 
Q. Now, it came from that standstill position to a point 
which you describe as being a third out in the street while this 
boy was traveling ten feet. Is that right! 
A. Something like that. 
Q. The car started up from a standstill and got out in the 
street to a position which you describe as being a third out 
in the street while the boy on the motorcycle was going ten · 
feet? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, you say, Mr. Bryant, the car was struck between 
the doors. Aren't you mistaken about that 7 
A. That is what I seen. 
Q. You saw tha.tf 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 26. } Q. If every other witness were to testify that it 
was struck . on the left rear fender or bumper-
A. (Interposing) I am telling you what I thought I saw. 
Q. I thought you were telling me what you saw. I un-
derstood you to say you saw it. 
A. I said I thought it hit between the doors. 
Q. You told me it hit between the doors, now you want 
to tell the jury you thought it hit beween the doors. Is that 
the best you will do Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was there to prevent this young man on the motor-
cycle from turning and going by the car 7 
A. There was a car coming down a short ways from there 
and would have been there by the time on the right hand 
side. 
Q. Was the other car on its· right hand side of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There was plenty of room for a little. thing like a motor-
cycle to go between the cars, wasn't there t 
A. I don't think he had time to turn. 
Q .. You say he was traveling at a very moderate rate of 
speedY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How fast would you term a moderate rate of speed for 
a motorcycle 7 
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.A. I should say about twenty miles an hour. Not quite 
that fast, I don't think. About fifteen miles. 
· page 27 ~ Q. Which do you think f 
A. Fifteen. 
By :W~r. Watkins: What are you asking him~ Whether he 
thinks that is a. moderate rate of speed or how fast was the 
motorcycle traveling y 
Mr. Coleman (Continues): 
Q. How fast was the motorcycle going¥ 
A. Fifteen miles an hour. 
Q. Y au want to tell the jury that you were looking and 
no signal was given. Is that right t 
A. I was noticing that way. 
Q. I want to ask you this question : Do you want the jury 
to miderstand your testimony to be. that you were looking 
and no signal was in fact given t 
A. I didn't see any signal. . 
Q. Yon don't undertake to tell the jury one was not in 
fact given, do yout 
A. I didn't see any signal given. 
Q. Is that·as much as you will say' 
A. I didn't see any si~L 
. • .. ! 
The witness stands aside. 
page 28 ~ The plaintiff, 
I\IRBY E. VIAR, 
being first duly sworn as a witness, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAl\IIINATION. 
By Mr. Watkins~ 
Q. Your name is Kirby E. Viar f 
A. ·yes, sir. -
Q. Ho'v old are you 1 
A. Seventeen. 
Q. How long have you been driving a motorcycle T 
A. About a year. 
' Q. Yon· were working on Jan nary 7th for Reynold's Drug 
Storef 
J.l. Yes, sir. · 
Q.- Driving their. motorcycle Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Just go ahead and describe to the jury what happened 
that night. 
A. I was coming up J\tiain Street at a moderate rate of 
speed, going toward Rivermont. After I crossed the inter-
section of 9th Street I saw that car pull out in front of me~ 
I just didn't have time to put brakes on or anything. 
Q. I-Iow fast were you driving¥ Were you speeding or 
anything like that 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You had come up l\tiain Street, I believe 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time of night was it Y 
. A. Around ten o'clock. 
page 29 r Q. Around ten o'clock on Saturday night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you said you had crossed the intersection of 
9th Street¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recollect that there are two white lines at 9tll 
Street, the place for pedestrians to walk in, one at the edge 
of the sidewalk and one in line with the row of buildings 1 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Had you crossed the last line or were you betwe·en 
the lines, or where were you with reference to those white 
lines¥ 
A. I was crossing the second white line. 
Q. Now, do you know where that other line is on the 
other side of ~fain Street in front of Wills-Camp's, that park-
ing line that comes do'\\~ on that street, do you know how 
far the edge of it next to 9th Street from the second line¥ 
.A. Seven feet. 
Q. As I understand it, this car driven by 1\IIr. Wright was 
parked in the first parking space inside tha.t parking line, 
is that right 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, just go ahead and tell me how the thing happened. 
You were crossing· the second white line when the 
page 30 } car started to pull out Y 
·A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just go ahead and describe what happened. 
A.· After I crossed the white line I seen him coming out 
and I didn't have time to stop or nothing, he come out so 
quick. 
- Q. How did he come out? Tell the jury how he came out. 
A. He came out in a rapid way. 
·Q. lJe did ~on1e out in a rapid 'vayY 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your motorcycle hit what part of the carY 
A. The back fender or back bumper. It knocked me un-
conscious and I didn't know exactly where it hit. 
Q. Did you see any signal given Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he give you any signal that he was going to turn 
out of there! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you looking at it Y 
A. I was looking in front of me. 
Q. Did you have any reason to expect that a car was 
going to pull out of the parking place in front of you Y 
A. No, sir. , 
Q. Could you have stopped the motorcycle after he pulled 
out in front of you without striking him Y 
page 31 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. How fast were you going? Would you esti-
mate it if you don't knowt 
A. Around fifteen miles an hour. 
Q. You weren't speeding or going fast or anything like 
thatY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, you say it knocked you unconscious Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What else did it do to you Y 
A. It just cut my leg open and I had a slight lick on the 
left side of my head. 
Q. A lick on the left side of your headY 
A. Yes, sir. _• 
Q. Cut your right knee open Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. :ijow long were you unconscious Y 
A. About an hour. 
Q. About an hour. You came to at the hospital 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the wound in your leg there 7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you show that wound to the jury Y Come around 
where they can see it. (Witness exposes his knee.) -·· 
A. I didn't wake up until they got most of it sewed up, 
· but they told me it was cut back here and the meat 
page 32 ~ pulled back and grit and dirt was all ground in it. 
Q. Go ahead and describe to the jury the condi-
tion of that knee after you were in the· hospital and from 
then and until sometimes afterwards. Did it hurtY Tell them 
~~fu~ . 
i 
I. 
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A. Well, it hurt most of the time and it was so stiff I 
couldn't use it to walk on and it is now: still weak. If I walk 
any distance at all it gives away on me. 
Q. You were out of work, I believe, about three weeks, 
weren't you Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go back to work before your knee got well Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you go back to work before it got well Y 
A. Because I had to. 
Q. Was your knee stiff after you went back to work f 
A. Just about stiff. I could use it a little. 
Q. You say it is weak now: if you stand on it too much Y 
A. Yes, sir.-
Q. That car that Mr. Wright was driving, what was written 
on that car7 
A. Piedmont and Shenandoah Cafe, 'phone numbers, and 
Day or night. 
· Q. State, if you know, how long he had been driving that 
car. You had seen him driving that car before, hadn't you? 
A. I had seen him driving around town for two 
page 33 ~ or throo months. 
Q. Who pays your bills Y 
.A.. I pa.y them. 
Q. How much was your hospital bill7 
A. Forty dollars. 
Q. What was the hospital billY 
A. $14.50. 
Q. Doctor's bill? 
A. $40.00. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: . 
Q. II ow old did you say you were? 
A. Seven'ieen. 
' 
. ' 
.! 
' 
Q. You have be.en operating a motorcycle for about a year? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. How far had this car operated by Mr. Wright gotten 
straighte:tled out in the street before you struck itf 
A. Well, about a third out in the path. 
Q. About a third out in the street f 
A. Yes, sir, or a little over. . 
Q. I understand you to say it came out in the street at a 
rapid rate of speed. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Well, .it came- from a· standstill ·position, didn't itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 34 ~ Q. The only way he could have come out was 
_ by putting the car in low gear to have started out. 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That i.s the way this car came out here, is that right r 
A. Yes, sir. · . -
Q. From a standstill position Y 
A. Y.es, sir. · . - . 
Q. Had gotten about a third in the street before you ever 
struck it¥ 
A. About a third or a little over. I don't know exactly . 
. Q. How fast were you traveling? · 
A. About fifteen miles an hour. . 
Q. I want you to tell the jury please, J{irby, why traveling 
at fifteen miles an hour you couldn't have brought your 
motorcycle to a stop from the time it took that man to come 
from a standstill position and get nearly a third of the 
car in the· streetf · 
A. I didn't have time. 
Q.- You ~idn't have· time¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Within what dista]Jce can you stop a motorcycle travel-
ing :fifteen miles an hour Y 
A. Ten or twelve f~t, I reckon. 
Q. So you could have stopped the motorcycle within ten 
or twelve feet 1 
page 35 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You want the jury to understand yon were 
closer than ten or twelve feet when this car pulled out t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It got from a standstill position to a little over a third 
of it in the street while you were traveling ten or twelve 
feet? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that what you want them to understand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Couldn't you have turned your motorcycle to your left 
there1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why?' . 
A. A car 'vas coming down Main Street. If I had turned 
I would have hit the other ca,.r coming down right in the 
face.· 
Q. Why couldn't you have turned to the right Y 
A. I would have hit him. 
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Q. You say you struck him on the rear of 'the left bumper' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You struck him right in the rear Y Is that right 7 
A. No, sir. On the back bumper and fender. 
Q. Take this car (using a small toy automobile) and show 
us how it happened. 
page 36 } A. He was standing like this. He came out likl~ 
this and I ran into it right there. 
Q. You are putting your hand on the wheel. 
A. Like that. 
Q. Didn't you say bumper? 
A. Bumper and fender together. 
Q. Now, Kirby, you testified in the police court, didn't 
you¥ 
A. ¥es, sir. 
Q. You told the situation substantially as you saw it, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the 13th day of January. That was on the 13th day 
of January, 1933 ¥ 
A. No, sir, January 7th. 
Q. The accident happened on January 7th and testified in 
the police court on January 13th. 
A. I don't remember what date that ·was. 
Q. That was in fact the date. I have the record of it. Your 
recollection that soon after it would have been better tl1an 
no,v, wouldn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir, I reckon so. 
Q. It would have¥ 
A. I reckon so. 
Q. Your recollection within a few da.ys after the accident 
would be better than it is now in ~larch? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 37 } Q. I will ask you if you didn't testify as follows 
in the police court : You 'vere asked this question 
by 1\fr. vVaters: 
''Q. Mr. Wright cut in front of you and you struck him 
but you did strike him in the rear of his car, didn't you? 
"A. Not exactly in the rear but on t~e left bumper." 
Then the next que~tion and answer: 
'' Q. He was not coming· out like that when you hit him? 
''A. I don't know exactly how it happened.'' 
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· - Is that true Y 
A. I don't know exactly where I hit him. No. 
Q. I will ask you when you said, ''I don't know exactly 
how it happened". Is that true or not! 
A. What I mean is I don't know exactly where I hit the 
car. 
Q. I will continue on: 
'' Q. Kirby, do you really remember how it happened Y 
''A. I was coming up Main :S'treet and he pulled out in · 
front of me. 
'' Q. You saw it suddenly when the car was in front of 
you but you don't know whether he had finished pulling out 
when you saw it or not. 
"A. No, sir." 
Q. Do you want the jury to understand that you didn't 
know wha.t you were talking about then Y 
A. I don't know exactly where I struck the car. 
Q. You stated in here in your answer, "on the left bumper". 
A. As well as I can remember that is where I was headed 
for the last time I seen it. 
Q. As well as you can remember that is where you were 
headed at when you last saw it Y 
page 38 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you say that you didn't see any signal. 
Is that right t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you want the jury to understand that there was ab-
solutely no signal given T 
A. I didn't see any. 
Q. You didn't see any Y 
A. No," sir. 
Q. r ou just want them to know you d.idn 't see any signal f 
A. I didn't see any signal. 
Q. This car is painted white or cream color! 
A. Yes, sir. Cream color. _ 
Q. That would be ordinarily much easier to see than a 
car painted black or blue as they customarily ar~' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You could see it plainly as you came down the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were knocked unconscious and you don't remember 
anything further about itt -
A. No, sir. 
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-By the Court: 
Q. Kirby, exactly where were you; to the best of your 
recollection, when that car started to move out from the 
parking1 
A. I was crossing the last white line. 
page 39 r Q. How far in front of you was the car tQ.en 7 
A. From that last line to the last parking space 
is seven feet. 
Q. Was he right back to the white line t 
A. Yes, sir, in the last parking space. 
Q. Back to tlte white line 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You mean you had only seven feet to go when you 
first saw it Y 
A. He had space to pull up in front of me and pull out. 
Q. I-I ow far had he pulled Y 
A. Twelve or :fifteen feet. 
Q. He had pulled out twelve or fifteen feet 7 
A. No, sir, he had left the parking space from the white 
line twelve or :fifteen feet. 
Q. What I am trying to get at is exactly where you were 
when you saw the car . 
.A. I had crossed the last white line. 
Q. Where was the car the:p? 
A. Pulling out. 
Q. How far had it pulled out? 
.A. It just started out. It came out so suddenly I didn't 
have a chance to do nothing. 
Q. _What was the distance between you and the car at·that 
time when you first saw it 7 
.A. I reckon it was about ten feet. 
page 40 ~ Q. You were going about :fifteen miles an hour, 
yo11:_ say7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What distance can you stop in going at that rate7 
A. Ten or twelve feet I reckon. 
Q. Did you put on your brakes 7 
. .A. I didn't have time. I put them on but didn't have 
time to stop. 
Q. Slow up any' 
A. Yes, sir, slowed up. _ 
Q. Did you swerve to the right or left to try to avoid it! 
A. No, sir, I didn't have time. I tried to put on the brakes. 
There was a car coming down Main Street and if I had· run 
around I would have run into that. · 
. · Q. Were you looking to see if he gave a signal before he 
pulled out T . __ 
·----------- ~------- ---------
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A. Yes, sir, I was looking straight ahead. 
Q. Past h1m or at this car 7 
- ·A.· I was looking ahead. I was riding between the car rails. 
Q. If .he ha,d given a signal would you have seen it or 
missed it¥ 
A. I am positive I could have seen it. · 
Q. Are you positive you would have seen it 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 41 ~ Q. Do you remember the instant of the impact 1 
A. The last thing I remember I was headed for 
the car and I knew I couldn't stop. I had. on the brakes 
and I couldn't stop. That was the last thing· I remember. 
Q. How far were you from the car then¥ 
A. Within h:m or twelve feet. 
Q. Yon don't remember anything further than from when 
you got within ten or twelve feet¥ 
A. Yes, sir, I remember until I hit him. 
Q. Do you remember exactly when you hit him¥ 
A. I couldn't say exactly where I hit him but I think I 
hit him on the back bumper. 
Q. Do you know what position his car was in then Y 
A. Yes, sir, in an angle. Sitting something like that. 
Q. Hadn't gotten straightened out Y 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued). 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q: Kirby, the car is bound to have been at p·retty much 
of an angle or you wouldn't have struck him a.t the rear 
bumper. 
A. He was sitting something like that. (Indicating.) 
Q. The point I make is this : He had moved from a stand-
still position where your own witnesses testified he was stand-
ing, yon see f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 42 r Q. If he had not gotten out a good ways in the 
street you would have struck him up around the 
door or fender, wouldn't you Y 
A. He had gotten almost out in the street. 
Q~ _Not exactly straightened out. \Veil, weren't you coming 
all the time he· was coming that distance Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Couldn't you see him 1 
A. I s~en hi~ after he gqt in my sight. 
Q. You say you could have stopped your motorcycle in 
ten or twelve feet Y 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \iVhy didn't you~ 
A. I couldn't. 
Q. Are your brakes defective? 
A. They are good. 
Q. Good or bad 1 
A. Good. 
Q. "VVhy wouldn't they stop 7 
A. I didn't have time to stop. 
. Q. I don't want to be too persistent about this, but as I 
understand from you this car moved from a standstill posi-
tion, as . you stated a mon1ent ago; had gotten practically 
straight, and during all that time it was moving you were 
coming on down: the street. 
A. 1res, sir. . 
Q. N o,v, I ask you why during that time, if you 
page 43 } could stop your motorcycle within ten or twelve 
feet, you couldn't ha~e stopped this time 7 
A. I didn't have enough space to stop in. 
By One of the Jurors: 
Q.; Were any cars parked on this side of of Main Street 
on the opposite side from "\Vills-Camp 's Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there a car between that car and the curb on the 
Wills-Camp side t 
A. There was a Cal' sitting right in front of Mr. vVright's 
car. 
~1r. Coleman (Continues): 
_ · Q. If I uuderstand correctly there was a car parked im-
mediately in front of Mr. Wright's car. · 
A. 1[ es, sir. . 
Q. Mr. Wright's car had gotten out and 'vas approximately 
in front of this car in front of it i 
A. No, sir. It came out like this and I hit him right in 
there. (Indicating.) 
Q. When you first saw the car it was moving·¥ 
A. 1[ es, sir. 
Q. The first time you saw it f 
A. Part of it was in the street. 
Q. If it was movi~1g ·when you first saw it, isn't it entirely 
possible that the sigi;tal could have been given be-
page 44 ~ fore the car started moving, if you first saw i1 
when it was moving1 
.A. Pause. 
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Q. Let me get that straight. I understood you to state 
tha.t when you first saw the car it was moving, is that right Y 
A. Yes, sir. When I first sa'v the car it was headed out -
in the street. 
Q. I will ask you this question: If .the signal had been 
given before the car ever started moving isn't it possible 
you wouldn't have seen it Y 
A. I could have seen it if he had given a signal. I was 
looking in front of ine. 
Q. You said the first time you saw the car was when it 
started moving. W11y didn't you see it before that time Y 
A. I was looking in front of me. I wasn't looking at the 
cars on the side I was looking in front of me. 
Q. You were not looking at the cars on the side Y 
A. No, sir. 
·- The witness stands aside. 
page 45 ~ The. witness, 
WM. B. RIVES,. 
having· been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. "'\iVatkins: 
Q. Mr. Rives, what is your business T 
A. Service Station operator. 
Q. Which one Y 
A. Garland Hill Filling Station, 5th and Harrison. · 
Q. Do y~u.service the cars that are used down at the Pied-
mont Cafe as delivery· .cars Y 
A. Y-es, sir. 
Q. How long have you been servicing them Y 
A. Since last July. · 
Q. Who paid the bills for servicing those cars Y 
A. Mr. F. L. Forbes. 
Q. Did he. pay them by cheekY 
A. By his check, yes, sir. They were formerly paid by his 
check but at present they are working on what is called a 
"Courtesy card''. It is a little charge plan issued by the 
Gulf Refining Company. They come in .and present a card 
and it is charg-ed to them. 
Q. Who is it charged toY 
.A .• F. L. Forbes. 
Q. Who pays itY 
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A. I don't know, sir. 
Q. But it is charged to F. L. Forbes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 46 } No cross "examination. 
The witness stands aside. 
By 1\{r. Watkins: We rest. 
By Mr. Coleman: Your Honor please, we would like to 
make a motion. 
By the Court : Let the jury retire. 
By 1\{r. Coleman : Your Honor please, we want to move 
the Court to strike out the evidence for the plaintiff on two 
grounds : One, that there has been no negligence on the part 
of the defendaJlt, and secondly, that the plaintiff by his own 
statement has sho·wn hims.elf to be guilty of contributory neg-
ligence which would bar recovery. 
By the Court : I think there is enough evidence to let it go 
to the jury. 1\{otion overruled. 
By Mr. Coleman: Counsel for the defendants excepts to . 
the Court's ruling for the reasons stated above. 
page 47 r DEFENDANTS' TESTIMONY. 
The witness, 
J. M. BURRUSS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By 1\{r. Coleman: 
Q. 1\fr. Burruss, you are a police officer in the City of 
Lynch burg, are you not 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. In the line of your official duties did you make an in-
vestigation of an accident which occurred on the night of 
January 7th, wherein a young boy by the name of Kirby 
E. Viar was injured. 
- A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you got there had the car operated by Wright 
be'en moved-
By Mr. Watkins: I object to that-
By Mr. Coleman: I 'vithdraw the question. 
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Q. Did you go to the seen€ of the accident 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I will ask you to please describe to the jury what the 
p.osition of the \Vright car was in ~{ai~ Street when you got 
there. 
A. The "\Vright car was sitting right in front of Wills-
Camp's. There is a door going up into the Lynch Building 
and it was sitting right in front of that door, 
page 48 } heading up 1\tlain Street and sitting sixteen feet 
from the curb. 
Q. Sixteen feet from which curbY 
A. The right curb going up ~lain Street toward 5th. 
Q. I will ask you to please state to the jury what the ap-
proximate position in the street was. Practically straight 
in the street, or how was it 7 
A. Practically straight. 
Q. Practically straight in the str€etf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did any other officer assist you in making this investi-
gation Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q·. I wisli you would please state to the jury if there \Vas 
any evidence of it having struck anywhere. 
A.. There was a. fresh mark on the left rear wheel and 
bumper. 
Q. Left rear wheel and bumper Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, taking this little car here, in that posi-
tion there? 
A. Yes, sir. The bumper and hub cap looked like it scraped 
and the side of that fender and wheel. 
Q. Was the motorcycle there in the street? 
A. They had carried it up the· street a bloek away. 
Q. Did you go up and look at the motorcycle? 
A. Yes, sir. It had fresh marks on the front 
page 49 ~ bumper. 
Q. On the front bumper 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the tire blown out f 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't mean bumper, you mean fender, don't you 1-
·A·. Yes, sir. . · 
Q. Did this defendant here, 'Vright, show you where he 
was parked on the street, sir Y 
A. Where was it 7 
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By Mr. Watkins: I object. 
By the Court: That can't be admissible. 
By Mr. Coleman: Why' 
By the Court: Because it is inadmissible testimony. 
By },rir. Coleman: I want to show a measur~ment from a 
point where I will put l\{r. Wright on the witness stand to 
prove as to where the car was. 
By 1\Ir. Watkins : He don't lrno'v where the accident 'vas. 
By the ·Court: If you are going to follow it up ask him 
the question. 
page 50 } 1\Ir. Coleman (Continues) : 
Q. Did 1\ir. Wright show you where he was 
parked? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you to state to the jury, from that point how 
·far it was to where the car was when you got there. 
A. Twenfy-four feet. 
CROSS EXAlVIINATION . 
. By Mr. Watkins: 
Q. Where did he say he 'vas parked 7 
A. Twenty-four feet down the street. 
Q. Where did he say he was parked 7 
A. Beside the curb. 
Q. As I understood you, you said there was a car parked 
here on this street in front of Wills-Camp's. 
A. No, sir, I didn't say that. I don't know whether it was 
or not. 
Q. Wright said his car was parked where? 
A. He pointed out that his ·car was parked back here in 
the :first space. · 
Q. You say his car was standing in front of the entrance 
to the Lynch Building? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Do you know how far it is from the back of this parking 
line to the door of the Lynch Building? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you measure from? You said from the point 
his car was standing on the car track . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
page 51 ~ Q. Was any car standing between it and the 
curb? 
· A. I don't remember. 
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Q. What point did you measure from Y ·From the back 
of the car to the place, or·from the front of the car, or fro1n 
whatY 
A. I· n1easured from the middle of his car back the mid-
dle of the pl~ce he was parked. 
Q. Did he tell you he was even with this car here that 
was parked in front of him. Did he tell you he had pulle4 
out and was even with this car 'vhen he was struck-. . 
By the Court (Interposing) : He wasn't asked about that. 
The witness stands aside. 
The defendant, 
L. C. WRIGHT, 
having been first d~ly sworn as a witness, testifies as. fol-:-
lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By 1\'Ir. Waters; 
Q. 1\IIr. Wright, you 'vere driving the truck in question 
at the time of this accident in January Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho'v long had you been driving that carY 
A. Going on two years. 
Q. Who owned that truck, Mr. Wright? 
A. ~Ir. James I. Forbes. 
page· 52 ~ Q. It was not owned by Mr. F. L. For be~ 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who employs you Y 
· A. James I. Forbes. . 
. Q. Did you thoroughly understand at the time you were 
employed that you were working· for James I. Forbes and 
not working, for F. L. Forbes? 
A. Hadn't anybody ever said anything to ine about work-
ing except James L Forbes. 
Q. Who paid yon Y 
A. James I. Forbes. 
Q. ·You did delivering for F. L. FurbesY 
A. I do delivering for four or five places. 
Q. Your understanding is that Mr. James I. Forbes has 
.a contract _to do that-
By the Court (Interposing): You can't answer that ques-
tion. 
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Mr. Waters (Continues): 
Q. You were not working for F. L. Forbes at the time of 
the accident Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever worked in the delivery business for Mr. 
F. L. Forbes? . 
A. No, sir, Mr. F. L. Forbes hasn't anything to do with the 
deli very business. . -
page 53}- Examination by Mr. Frost: 
Q. Mr. Wright, you are the L. C. Wright in-
volved in a collision between a motorcycle and a delivery·car 
on the night of January 7th, are you not 7 
.. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time did this accident happen Y 
A. As well as I remember it was between ten ·and eleven 
o'clock· at night. 
Q. Where was your car parked prior to the accid-ent Y 
A. In front of Wills-Camp Company. The first parking 
space toward 9th Street. 
:· Q. Any car parked behind you on the 9th Street side of 
your cart 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Your car was the first car in the parking space in front 
of Wills-Camp's Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there a car parked in front of you 7 
A. Y ~s, sir, a car parked in front of me. 
Q. Did you get in your car and proceed to drive it away Y 
A. ·No, sir. 
B:v the Court : 
·Q. How far in front of you was the car parked in front? 
A. Just like they park. A foot or two. 
Q. Did you have to back to get out? 
A. ·Yes, sir, I am going to tell that now. 
page 54 } Mr. Frost (Continues): 
Q. Tell what happened? 
A. There was a car in _front of me. I got in my car, put my 
packages in, held out my hand with the door open, looked back 
like this (Indicating) and backed on back. 
Q. Looking back while you were backing 1 
A. Yes, sir, and holding the door open. I closed the door, 
held out my hand and cam-e out of the parking space like 
this and came in front of this car here. 
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, Q. That was th~ car p~rk.ed in front of you originally. You 
got- up in front of that car f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. What happened then1 . 
A. All at once I ·heard a bump against the car like that and 
I looked out of the side and couldn't see it.- I pulled the brakes 
on and looked back and this boy was laying there and the 
motorcycle was laying there. 
Q. Ho\v far had your car_ gone from the time yo1;t felt the 
bu~p until the time you stopped the car f 
A. I suppose around twenty feet. 
Q. I don't believe you understand niy question exactly; 
From the time you felt the blow of something running into 
the rear of your car, you s_tated that whe~ you felt that you 
stopped your car. · 
A .. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. Hqw far had you run during that interval of time? 
A. I didn't ruTi_ any ways at all. 
Q. Were you going fast¥ 
page 55 ~ A. No, sir. I was in low gear. 
Q. You want the jury to believe, or at least you 
testify that you felt the bu1np and stopped practic~lly at once; 
is that correct 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Went no distance at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How was your car lined up in the street when you 
:;topped1 .. 
A. Straight with the car tracks. 
Q. Was your car moved during the interval of time between 
the time of the accident and the time Mr. Burruss got there? 
A. No, sir. · · 
Q. You left the car just as it was at the time of the accident? 
A. I got out and left it there. 
Q. Will you tell the jury whether you had straightened out 
·th(\ car or not and \vhether you had p1:oceeded any distance or 
not Y · · 
A. Yes, sir. 1\{y car was straight in the street. 
Q. Had you p1~oceeded any distance from the time of leav-
ing ·the parking space. to the time of the collision f 
A. About twenty feet. 
Q. What direction? 
A. North. 
- · Q. Toward 8th Street? 
·page 56 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When the policeman came to the scene of the 
accident did you point out to him where you were parked f 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. You testified when you were backing in order to· pull on 
away from the curb you held the door open and looked back 
while you were backingt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall what color the sig·nal light in 9th and 
~lain was at tim-e 1 
A. If I am not mightily mistaken it was red. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Watkins: 
Q. You don't know' 
A. I didn't have to see it. I thought it was red and there 
were no cars passing at that till)e. 
Q. You said you didn't have to se~ it 1 
A. I didn't have to look at it. I had to go to the front. The 
stop light was behind rn-e. 
Q. Now J\tir. Wright, let's say that this paper represents. 
the parking space, not the street but the parking space. ·You 
say you were pal'l{ed back here next to the end of this parking 
space. Here's the curb and here's the street out here. Show 
me wher-e your car 'vas parked with reference to the. end of 
the parking line. Just put this toy car where it 'vas parked 
with reference to the end of the parking line. Just 
page 57 ~ put it there where it was. parked with reference to 
this end of the parking line next to· 9th Street. 
A. I was parked right inside of it. 
Q. The back end of your car was just over inside the line¥ 
A. Yes, sir. I was inside the line. 
Q. The other car, you say, was parked where? 
A. Right up in front of me. 
Q. I understood you to say there was not over two feet 
between your car and the car in front of you. 
A. I don't think it was. 
Q. Do you know or is there any question about there being 
two feet between your car and the other car¥ 
A. About two feet. 
Q. I understood you to tell the jury before you could get 
out you backed back. About how many f.eet did you back~ 
A. About five feet in all. 
Q. I will ask you 'vhether or not you know that this white 
line that marks the parking· limit and two white lines that 
come across here-this last white line is even with the line 
of builaings on 9th Street, isn't it 1 
A. I don't know. 
( 
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Q. I will ask you if _you don't know that last white line. is 
seven feet from the back end of that. parking space .. Do you 
){DOW that f . . 
A. I thoug·ht it was supposed to be ten feet. 
· Q. You tell the jury that you backed four feet 
page 58 ~ in this space back of the parking line before you 
started out and then you cut your car like this T. 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Then you came out in the street¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Show me how far you went with reference to this car. 
A. I reckon I went about twenty feet. 
Q .. Besides this other carY 
A .. I was up in front of it. 
Q. How far in front of itt Show the jury with these toy 
.. ~ars how far in front. 
A~ About like this. 
Q. The back end of your car was up to the front of the 
other carT 
A. The middle of my car was even with the front of it. 
· Q. Your car was parked here behind this car. Do you mean 
to tell the jury you had driven to twenty feet from the place 
yon backed back or from the place you parked¥ . 
A. From the place I had to start from when I backed back. 
Q. You backed back four or five feet baek here Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long is your carY 
A._ I suppose it is about nine feet long. Between eight and 
ten f-eet, anyway. 
· Q. If you backed five feet that would be thirteen feet, if the 
car was. eight feet, and two more feet would be 
page 59 ~ fifteen feet up to where you turned this car, and if 
your car went five more feet you would be back 
there. (Indicating.) If you went twenty feet from where 
you backed up, wouldn't your car be back up here Y 
A. It would be up here near the middle of this car where 
I told you. 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Burruss testify! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He testified your car was sitting in front of the door 
that goes up into the Lynch Building. 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. Have you noticed that place there recently! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you if you don't know that if you park a car 
in here and park another car there the door to the Lynch 
Building is along· about the radiator of this front car. 
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A. I haven't noticed that. 
Q. The door to the Lynch Building would strike the car 
about there at the front fender. 
A. No, sir, I haven't noticed that particular point. . 
Q. You said something· about parking your car. Of course 
you did not know that this boy was any where in the world. 
A. No, sir. 
Q·. You didn't see him 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far did you look back down the street! 
- · - A. I don't know. I would say within the .park-
page 60 } ing line to see if I didn't hit anybody in the park-
ing line.· 
Q. You were not looking back for traffic in 9th StreetY 
A. When I started out I h~ld out my hand. 
- Q. Did you look back and hold out your handY 
A. I held_my hand out and drove out. When you get in 
a car and hold your hand out if you don't see anything you can 
see like this. (Indicating.) If you look this way and don't 
see anything you can proceed on. 
Q. Is that your conclusion· of the law1 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is your understanding of the la.w¥ 
·· A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. So you tell the jury that you opened your· door and 
backed back four or five feet, then shut your your door and 
looked straight ahead and without looking to see if any-
A. (Interposing) I told you I held my hand out and didn't 
see anything I could see within my spaces. 
· Q. How far could you see 7 
A. I don't know. About the length of the car, I reckon. 
Q. You couldn't see if any car was coming across 9th 
Street, Mr. Wright1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yon closed your door and held your hand out. Did 
you take your hand in before you started to drivet 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You kept your hand out while you were turn-
page 61 ~ ing your car into the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You don't know whether anybody was coming across 
that intersection when you pulled out or not, do you t 
A. There was not. . 
Q. You held your hand out and pulled in that line of traf-
fic without ascertaining whether there was any traffic crossing 
or not. 
-----------------~~--- --·---
Stl -Supr~m~ -Co:ni:t o~ :App~nls of ''irginia. · 
A. There wasn't any traffic. 
Q. Did y.ou loo~ Y- -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I mean at the time you started to pull your car out there 
did you look back 1 
_ A. YeE?, sir. _. . . 
Q. How far did you look back down the street f . _ 
.A. Sitting- on the driver's side i~ you look back you can't 
see any further than the end of your car. I didn't turn ~y 
head around irt the car and look like this. 
_ Q. You didn't look out of the window and se~ if any traf-
fic was coming or n9t ~ _ : 
A. If I had done that I would have been up on top of the· 
steering wheel. · 
Q. You didn't do it1 
A. I couldn't have done it. I looked back to see thaf I 
~idn 't hit anything _when I backed. 
· Q. Before you proceeded you closed your door: 
page 62 ~ and pull~d out into the traffic without seeing if any~ 
cars were coming. 
A. No, sir. . . 
Q. You didn't look back to see if any more cars 'vere com-
ing. 
A. Yes, sir. I got in my car. Closed the door after I :fin-
ished backing, closed the door, looked back of me on the side 
of me and couldn't see no traffic. I held my hand out, pulled· 
right on out and started on up the street. 
· Q. ·You never did see the motorcycle t 
A. No, sit. 
Q. You couldn't see when you looked out of there arty fur-
ther than your back wheel. Is that what you testified toY 
A. No, sir. · . 
Q. That 'vas before you started to pu~l out? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. ·Q. No,v, ~{r. Wright,_ I believe you said yon got in front of 
that car when ~Ir. Cole.man was examining you, I mean Mr .. 
Fro~ · 
· .A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't I unders.tand you to say you 'vere in iront of that 
car when you 'vere struck t . 
A. Half' of the car was beside of it. 
Q. ~alf of your ear. was beside the other car f 
A. Yes,· sir. · 
Q. You say you were· in low gear? . 
Q. You had traveled twenty feet up in the street 
page 63 ~ in low gear? . , 
A. Yes, sir. ·.r-. 
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Q. You hadn't changed your gears at all 7 
A! No, sir.·· · · 
Q. Ho\v long do you generally drive twenty or twenty-
five feet in low gear before changing? 
A. It depends. 
Q. You were straightened up Main Street at that time Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You told lJir. Frost you had proceeded some distance 
after you got straightened in the street. How far do you sup-
pose you had proceeded¥ · 
A. I suppose about ten feet. 
Q. You had· gone ten feet after yon had got straightened 
out? 
~A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still you hadn't shifted your gears. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, this was Saturday ·night and it was dark except 
for the street lights. · 
A. Plenty of lights there. 
Q. Except for the street ligl1ts it was dark! 
.A. Yes, sir, but you could see as plain as day time. 
Q. A good deal of traffic. Cars parked on both sides prac-
tically solid on Saturday night? 
.A. About that time of night they start thinning 
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. · Q; Now, ~Ir. Wright, ~Ir. James I. Forbes is 
the manager of the Piedmont Cafe for Mr. F. L. Forbes, isn't 
he? · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So as manager he pays all the help around there, 
-doesn't he f 
... A. Yes, ·sir. 
Q. How does he pay you? 
A. By cash in a money envelope. 
Q. Do you know where he gets it from Y 
.A. No, sir, I do not. 
Q ... Do you know \vhetber he g·ets it from the cash drawer or 
not? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Does he pay you at the same tin1e he pays· the other 
employ-ees~ . 
A. No, sir. The day you go to work, the week from that 
.day yoti draw your· pay~ · · - · 
Q. All you know is that you \Vent to work there and Mr. 
James I. Forbes got you ·to come down to go to work¥ 
: A. No, sir, I have saw the titles and I know Mr. James I. 
Forbes owns them. 
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Q. We admit he owns them. - · · · 
A. The insurance is in his name and all bills .are paid by 
·him. · 
Q. What? 
A. Bills. 
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A. Gas and oil. 
· Q. Did you hear Mr. Rives testify? 
. A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you hear him testify that the bills were made to F. 
L. },orbes? 
-· A. They don't pay him. They pay the o:ffiee somewhere, 
the Gulf Refining Company. . 
Q. Did you hear him say they ·were charged. to Mr. F. L. 
Forbes? 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
·: _. Q. Do you know who signed the checks Y 
A. I have took checks to the Lynchburg Garage. Q. Whose checks? 
A. J. I. Forbes. 
Q. On what hankY 
A. Lynchburg National Bank. 
Q .. Po you know they are James I. Forbes' checks you take 
up there to pay for those cars T 
A. Yes, s~r, I looked at .it . 
. Q. Did you ever take one up here to pay for gas and oil f 
A. They don't pay for it. . 
Q. Was Mr. R-ives wrong when he said Mr. Forbes used to 
pay it up there Y 
By Mr. Frost: ~Ir. Rives said it was charged and.now they 
have courtesy cards. I think that it what his tes-
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· By Mr. Watkins: I submit, he said it was actu-
ally paid by F. L. Forbes' check, but now he said it is not 
paid but_is charged. · · 
By the Witness (Interposing) : We sign the tickets made 
to the Piedmont Cafe. 
Mr. Watkins (Continues) : 
Q. Piedmont Cafe Y 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. James I. Forbes don't own any interest in the Piedmont, 
does he? 
A .. No, sir. He has the contract to haul for them. 
Q. We are going to see about that contract. Were you 
present when the contract was made! · 
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ll. ~o, sir. . 
Q. Is it in writing¥ 
ll. I don't know. 
Q. How do you know, Mr. Wright, tliere is any contract Y 
ll. I said Mr. James I. Forbes owns the cars. 
Q. You don't propose to tell theju:ry there is an independ-
ent contract between James I. Forbes and F. L. Forbes Y 
ll. That is their business. 
. Q. .A.ll you know is that you get your money envelope fro~n 
J ame.s I. Forbes. You don't know ~hether he gets it from · 
cash drawer or from F. L. Forbes' business there, 
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ll. ~o, sir. 
Q. You do know you were employed by Mr. James I. 
Forbes, but that he is the manager of the Piedmont Cafe. 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. ·You do hauling for the Piedmont Cafe, Shennandoah 
Cafe, Piedmont Market and the Electric- Maid Bake Shop 1 
~- Yes, sir. . -
Q: Who owns those ·places Y . 
A. They say Mr. F. L. Forbes. 
Q. You do_ hauling for all those places of Mr. Forbes Y 
.A.._ ·Yes, sir-.. ·- -- .. - - - · 
Q. You don't know why you do that hauling at all. You 
·don't know what the arrangement is. 
A. ~o, sir. 
Q. You know nothing about that Y 
A. ~o, sir. 
Q. You ever do any work inside the restaurants t 
ll. ~o, sir. 
Q. ~ever do anything but haul Y 
A. That is all. 
Q. Mr. F. L. Forbes could fire you if he wanted to, couldn't 
he? He owns the whole thing and could fire you and the 
other man too if he wanted to. 
A. I have been 'vorking there two years and if there was 
anybody to be fired M:r. James I. Forbes fired him. 
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I. Forbes is not there. 
Q. That is because he is the manager! 
A. The man that takes his· place is still the boss. 
Q. ~The man that takes his place runs the cafe! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The man that takes his place· is under the supervision of 
Mr. F. L. Forbes Y 
ll. ~o, sir. James I. Forbes. 
------
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Q. All take orders from F. L. Forbes f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Don't James I. Forbes take orders from -F. L. Forbes f 
A. I don't kn(nv~ -. · - · 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By J\IIr. Frost: 
· · Q. You sp'oke of certain measurements, Mr. Wright. Did 
you .actually measure those distances or were they approxi-
mations¥ 
A. Mr. Burruss, I think, measured them . 
. Q. You didn't _actually measure them? 
··A. No, sir. 
Q. When you had the door open looking back while back-
ing did you see any vehicles or motorcycles or anything in 
the intersection of 9th Street or anywhere that you thought 
would be in dang·er if you ran out~ · 
A. No, sir. If I had they could have got by me 
page 69 ~ before I got out. . · · . 
By ~Ir. Waters: 
Q. Some of your testimony was t~~t you are ·employed by 
'James I. Forbes, work for James I. Forbes and have noth-
ing to do 'vith the restaurant business but do run a delivery 
run and owned by James I. _Forbe_s. · · . 
A. Yes, sir. · 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. · 
By Mr. Watkins: 
Q .. You dqn 't know who owns the business T 
A. The titles are in the name of James I. Forbes. 
·· Q. You know he ·owns the delivery cars. 
-~· Yes, ~ir_. 
The witne_ss stands aside .. 
The witness, 
- . . - . JAMES I. FQ~BES, · 
llaving been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIREOT.EXA~I!NATION. 
By ~fr. Waters: 
Q. I understand your name is James I. Forbes f 
. . 
L. C. Wright & other, v. Kirby E. Viar, an Infant,_ etc. 57 
.-·A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a nephew of 1\{r. F. L. Forbes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It has been testified to that you are also the manager of 
F. _L. Forbes' business. 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 70 } Q. There was an automobile accident about J anu-
i. ary 7th by a truck or a car driv-en by L. C. Wright. 
Who owned that car? 
A. I did. . 
· · Q. Who was Mr. Wright working forY 
A. Working for me. 
Q. Explain to the jury -exactly your relation to your uncle 
'vith regard to the tru~ks and delivering things from the Pied-
mont and Shenandoah and the manner in which it was run. 
· '. A. l purchased the cars and we run on this basis : At the 
end of th-e year we figure up any profit or loss and we divide 
it, and the gas and oil is paid monthly fro~ the receipts we 
get from the delivery business, and the drivers wages, and 
all that is deducted at the end of the year. . · 
· Q. Is: .th-e delivery business your business or 1\{r. F. L. 
Forbes' business 1 
A. I am hauling for him. 
By Mr. Watkins: That is a question of law.as to. whethe1· 
there is a partnership or not. 
1\ir. Waters (Continues): 
.· Q. You have a contract with your uncle to deliver and 
it is your business and not your uncle's. Is that right! 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\lr. Watkins: 
Q. lVIr. Forbes, what did I understand you to say about 
dividing profits and losses? 
pag-e 71 } A. At the end of the year-he pays for the gas 
· · · a·nd· he -furnishes 1ne money through the year to pay. 
for the gas and oil. . 
Q. You deduct the expenses that have been paid for ga~ 
and oil and the driver·s? · · · 
A:: Yes, sir, that is right. · 
Q. Then you divide th-e profits if there is any money left 
over? · 
A. There is never · ~ny left over. 
ss. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Q. That is the agreement that if there is any .left over you 
are going to divide it~ . 
A. I get the profit for the use of the automobiles. 
Q. You say you are going to get the profits for the use of 
the automobiles. \Vhy did you say awhile ago you were·go-
ing to divi~e the profits! Why did you tell Mr. Waters you 
-were going to divide the profits with him and now· you say 
· if there any p_rofits you are going to get them 7 Explain 
to the jury what you meant. 
A. I haven't any explanation to make. 
Q. As a matter of fact you say there never has been any 
p~ofit. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How long have you been running that business? 
A. Two years in August. 
Q. You are not going to keep on running without any profit? 
- - A. I don't think it is going to pay. I have got 
page 72 ~ the equipment on hand and have got to use it. · 
· _ Q. Have you got a license for them Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q ... You ·know you have got a passenger ·car license for 
those cars? 
A. License like belongs on them. 
Q. ¥our number is 21.5-156 which is a passenger license 
and you never.paid for any truck license? 
By Mr. Coleman : ·What is the relevance to that Y 
By the Court: What has that got ·to do with this caseY 
By Mr. Watkins: I think it has got some probative value .. 
I think under t~e law Your Honor will instruct the jury that 
it. has nothing particular to do with this, but if he i~ going to 
hire these cars to somebody else the law requires him to get 
'' TH'' license which he hasn't got. 
By the Court: Go ahead with the testimony. 
Mr. ·watkins (Continues) : . 
Q. You haven't a "Fore Hire" license on the car at all T 
A.· No, sir.· 
Q. As a matter of fact Mr. F. L. Forbes has been paying 
gas and oil bills, hasn't heY 
page 73 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How do you pay Wright? 
A. I pay him from the money taken in from delivery. 
Q. How ·do you mean Y 
A. He checks up every day. 
Q. You charge people for delivering t 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho'v do you charge Y 
A. It depends on how much you get. 
Q. The delivery handles all the money and there is extra 
charge for d-elivering the goods? 
A. That is extra service we are giving them. 
Q. Extra service Mr. F. L. Forbes is throwing in for his 
customers. How do you pay Mr. WrightY Do you pay him 
out of your checking account' · 
A. No, sir, I pay him out of the restaurant account. 
Q. You pay him out of the Piedmont cash drawer, don't 
you7 · 
A. That is right. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Waters: 
Q. JYir. ~,orbes, do you ke-ep any account of the cost of op-
erating that business? 
. A. It it all kept separate from F. L. Forbes business. 
Q. Are you responsible for operating that delivery busi-
ness? 
page 74 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is Mr. Forbes under contract with you witli 
regards to his delivery business and r-estaurants and . the 
bakery? 
A. He is. 
Q. Now, if you make a profit on that is it your profi.tt 
By the Court : Both sides have been over that. I would like 
tq ask a question. 
Q. _Whose g·oods are these that you deliv-erY 
A. They come from the Piedmont Restaurant. 
Q. F. L. Forbes' goods! 
,4. Yes, sir. . 
. Q. You say that you are paid and the driver is paid and the 
gas bill is paid out of the money received for those goods t 
A. Yes, sir, but it is kept as a separate business. · 
By Mr. Waters: I think he misunderstood your previous 
question. 
Q. What is your contract with Mr. Forbes? 
A. Delivery business. 
The witness stands aside. 
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page 75 ~ By Mr. Coleman: Counsel for the .defendant, L. 
C. Wright, produced a ·stenographic copy of the 
proceedings in the police· court ··which was identified by the 
stenographer, C. R. McCarthy, who took down and tran-
scribed the evidence, as being all·. of the evidence· given in 
the police court proc~ediilg-s and being a true and accurate 
copy. of_ same. 
The' witness, 
L. M:. HECfiLER, 
·having ·been first duly sworn, testifies· as follows: 
DIRECT EXA:MINATIO·N. 
By Mr. Coleman: . . .. 
Q: Mr. Hechler, where do you liv-e Y 
A. I live in Rivermont. 
· Q. · I1i Lynchburg•, Virginia? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in Lynchburg on the night of J anliary 7,"1933, 
the night on which there was an accident between young Kirby 
Viar and a car operated by the def-endant, L. C. Wright t 
A. Yes, sir. · 
· · Q. Where·,vere you ·standing, Mr. Hechler¥ 
, A .. I was standing in front of the Piedmont l\1:arket · 
Q. I believe that is approximately· opposite Wills-Camp 
Company. 
A. Ir Wills"' Camp's is. on ·the corner this ·was· up above the 
corner. 
Q. Who was standing with you Y · 
page 76 ~ A. Mr. 1\fcKenney. . ; 
Q. Please state to the jury, sir, if you saw this 
truck or car parked there prior to the accident 1 · ·" 
A. Mr. Wright's car was parked on the right side:· 
Q. You saw it before the accident~ · · · · 
A. Yes, sir. . 
·Q: I·will ask yoU: whether or not it·w~s the first car parked 
there, that is, was there any car· back of it! · 
A. I don't think so .. 
Q. Were any cars parked immediately in front of it Y 
A.. Yes; sir. · · . · 
Q. Do you happen to know \Vhat the approximate distance 
\Vas between the W rig·ht car and the car parked in front of it 1 
A. No, sir, 'I c6uldn ~t ·say liow· much distance.· · 
Q. It was parked in front of it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. I want you to tell the jury, sir, in your own way just 
exactly what you saw when you were standing there . 
. ' A. Well, first we sa'v of it was when the motorcycle hit the 
car. 
. Q. Hit the car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state to the jury what was the approximate posi-
tion of the Wright car in the street at the time the motorcyele 
l1it the car. · 
A. Right straight out in the street opposite this car parked 
against the curb. 
page 77 } Q. Right straight in the street opposite the car 
· · that 'vas parl{ed in front of hiin. Any doubt in 
your mind about that at all 1 
A. None whatever. 
Q. I want you to tell the jury, please, sir, whether or not 
the blow that the young motorcycle driver hit him was glanc-
ing or solid. 
A. Solid· on. the left bumper. It hit and the motorcycle 
jumped out, it looked like to me, about -two feet and turned 
over on the ·side.· · · 
· Q. When it hit it looked to you like the motorcycle jumped 
about two f.eet? · 
A. ·Yes, si1~~ · · 
Q. Did the car operated by Wright come to a stop tlienY 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did it go any distance, or what distance, if any, did it 
go? 
A. Not hardly any distance. 
Q. The boy, I think your testimony was, was knocked un-
conscious. · 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you go over there¥ . 
A. I went over and caug·ht hold of his arm and two other 
f-ello,vs caught hold of him and two fello''"s took ·the motorey-
:cle. · vVhen they got him I turned him aloose and they carried 
him and put him in an automobile. . 
-pag·c 78 ~ Q. 'Please state whether or not the car operated 
by l\ir. Wrig·ht had been moved before the officer 
~had got there.· · · · 
A. The officer came before it was moved. 
· .. CROSS EX.A:MINATION. 
- -
By 1v[r. Watkins: . 
;_. ·Q. ·H.Owofar would_you say the Forbes' car ·went· after the 
motorcycle struek it' : . 
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A. No distance hardly. 
Q. How many feet? 
A. Not over three feet. It was moving very slow. He had 
just come out. . 
Q. You say he hit him in the back where Forbes, I mean 
Wright, couldn't see the motorcycle at allY 
A. No, sir, I don't think he could.· 
Q. Didn't injure the car any? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. You say he stopped practically instantly? 
A. Yes, sir. He hadn't gone over two or three feet, I 
reckon. Just as soon as he hit he stopped. 
- Q4 Where 'vas your attention, on the boy or the ·motor-
cycle, or both? · 
A. I was standing on the curb and I could see it when it 
hit. 
Q. You didn't see him before it was hit? · 
A. I didn't see the motorcycle come down the street. 
Q. You didn't see anything until they hit! 
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Q. You were looking at it when it bitT 
A. Looking right straight at it when he hit and saw the 
motorcycle turn over. 
Q. Didn't you testify down in the Municipal Co~rt in an-
swer to this question: ''Right across the street from where 
this accident happened" 1 Your ans,ver was, "Yes, sir. I 
was standing there talking to Mr. 1\fcKenney and as soon as 
it hit I turned around and I saw the motorcycle when it fell-~, 
A. I was a~most facing it then. 
Q. Did you turn around 
A. As soon as they hit I saw it .. 
Q. You didn't have to turn around to see it f 
A. I had to turn my head. 
Q. Whaf attracted your attention f 
A. When it hit. · 
Q. Yon didn't s.ee anything until it struck and then you 
turned your head to look over there t 
A. Yes, sir. Mr. Wright's car was right in the street op-
posite this other car. 
Q. By the time you turned around to see it this car had 
stopped? 
A. Mr. Wright's car had stopped. 
Q. You didn't see Forbes' car move at all T 
A. I seen it move some, yes, sir. After he hit ·he didn't 
move three feet. 
page 80 ~ A. It didn't stop moving until you turned around 
and you saw it move then Y 
L. C. Wright &. otheJ:~. v.. _~by ].J. Vmr, an Infant, etc. .6~ 
A. ·Yes, sir. . 
Q. You don't know whether Wright gave a signal Qr not. 
A. I couldn't tell that. - · 
Q. Was there a car coming down the street meeting this 
~y! . - . . 
A. No car coming down at that time. 
Q. No car coming down the street at all 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There was no car coming down at that time 7 
A . .After the accident they stopped above where the accident 
was. · 
Q. Who7 
A. The car coming down. 
Q. Tell the jury, with reference to this car that was parked 
on this side, just place the Wright car, show us where Forbes' 
or Wright's car was when it struck. · 
· A. Right here opposite this car. About like that. (Using 
the toy cars.) 
Q. Place it exactly. 
A. That is about right. 
- Q .. ·You say it was kind of in front 7 
A. Just like that. 
Q. In other words the back of his car was near the back 
of this one, not over two or three feet. -
.page 81 } A. Just about like you see them. · 
Q. Wright had pulled out from the back of this 
'Car like this 7 
. ·· By Mr. Frost : He has testified he didn't se.e him pull out. 
By Mr. Watkins: 
Q. You had seen the car parked there but d.idn 't see it pull 
-out. Is that right Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
The witness, 
JOHN L. McKIN:NEY, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr.' Coleman: 
Q. What is your nameY 
64 . · Supreme ·Court of' Appeals of Virginia· ... 
. A. J. L. ¥c1Gnney. . 
Q. -Where do you live Y 
A. I live here but am running a restaurant business in Al-
ta vista. - · · · · · · · · 
Q. Were you in town on the night of January 7th, 1933 t 
A. Yes, sir. , · · · · · 
Q. Did you see an accident between a boy operating a mo-
torcycle a~d ~car _operated _by~· C. "\Vright? 
-4-~. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Where were you standing lVIr. Mcl{inney ¥ 
page 82 ~ A. Right in front of the Piedmont 1\'Iarket. 
Q. Were you talking; to the gentleman that just 
~estified, 1\fr. ~-Iechler¥ · · · 
. A. Yes, sir. · .. · · · · · 
Q. I wish you, 'vould without prolonging the matter, please 
ju~t state to the jury just what you saw there. 
A .. Mr. Hechler and t were talking and heard a crash. When 
we heard it we both turned about the time the boy was falling 
in the street and ~Ir. 'Vright's car was straightened out and 
seemed that his car was just opposite the car parked at the 
curb, and he \Vas headed up the street. ·We seen the motor-
Qycl~ hit him square in the rear . 
. · · Q. I will ask you pleas-e· to state ·to the jury, if you remenl-
ber, sir, taking these little cars as models, where the Wright 
c~r was in the street 'vith reference to this other car ;-that is, 
how far it had gotten straight in the street? 
A. I thinl{ about parallel with the car that was parked, the 
best I remember. 
_. Q.- -Did 1 -understand you to state the ·motorcycle struck 
square in the back Y 
.. A. _Yes, sir,_ t9 on~ side~ Th_e left rear corner, but rather in 
the· back, I reckon. · · 
Q. Did Mr. Wright's car travel any distance after the mo-
torcycle struck him T · 
A. No, sir, by the time 've turned around Mr. Wright's car 
had stopped and the 'motorcycle fell ju'st at the 
page 83 ~ back of it. He didn't travel very far. 
Q. Had the car been moved before the offic.er 
got there? 
A. No, _si~, it had~'l .. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
- . - . . .. 
By 1\lr. 'Vatkins: 
Q. You say you and 1\fr. McKinney were standin-g' with your 
back to the accident~ . · · ·_ · . · . : · 
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A. R.ather· with our sides. Mr. Hechler and I were looking 
in opposite directions so when W·e heard the crash ·we both 
turned and we saw it about the time it hit. 
Q. You saw nothing before that time? 
· A.. We heard the crash. 
Q. Place these cars in the position the Wright car was in 
with reference to the car parked there. 
A. I think it was about like this. · 
Q. Y oti say about even? . 
A. Straightened out and about parallel with that car. 
Q. You didn't see him pull out at allY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. His. car was practically parallel with the car parked 
there? 
· A. I think he was. 
Q. Do you tell the jury that it hit direct in the back or hit 
a glancing blo'v on the wheel? 
A.' I think he must have hit right in the back. · J\fr. Wright 
must have been straightened out and I think he hit 
pg-e 84 } pretty well square. 
· Q. Did you examine Wright's car to see where 
it was hit¥ 
· ·A. That is 1ni impression of it. · . 
Q. As far as you know it may have been hit here on the 
wheel where the officer testified. 
A. I am pretty sure from the position of the car and the 
motorcycle it must have hit back here. 
Q. The officer testified there were fresh marks and inju-
ries on the fender and left back wheel. 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. You say you are not sure Y 
~' .A.. The side of this car had an old dent and 'vas damaged all 
along the side and fender. I don't kno'v about that. 
Q. You wouldn't tell the jury that the injury to the 'vheel 
wasn't cat'is.ed by the motorcycle, would you¥ 
. · A. I wouldn't tell them it was caused by it because I don't 
think it·was. 
Q. You wouldn't tell then1 it wasn't? 
- A. l\iy opinion is that he didn't hit that wheel. -
· . Q. Although you. didn't see it when it hit at all? 
A. I heard the crash aud turned as the boy fell. 
Q. You don't kno'v where it hit at all¥ 
- -A~ I coilldi1 't swear to the exact spot. 
The 'vitness stands aside. 
End of all Testimony. 
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page 85 ~ By Mr. Colem·an: I renew my motion. 
By the Court: 1\{otion overruled. 
By Mr. Coleman: Counsel for the defendant, L. C. Wright,. 
excepts to the ruling of the court for the reasons stated. 
By Mr. Waters: To be perfect!y frank, Mr. Forbes testified 
they divided the profits and losses and I think it is useless to 
take up time to say it wasn't a partnership. Isn't that the· 
conclusion of the Court Y 
By the Court : ·You admit there was a partnership. . 
OBtTECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS. 
RE: PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiff's instr:uction No. 1 given by the Court without be-
ing objected to. 
By ~{r. Coleman: Counsel for the defendant, L. C. Wright, 
objects to the Court giving instruction No. 2, offered for the 
plaintiff on the ground that there is no positive evidence that 
there was no signal given; that the only thing that can be 
said is negative testimony which would have to fall in the 
face of positiye testimony of the de.fendant in that he did in 
fact give a signal. 
page 86 ~ By the Court : I will give No. 2. 
By 1\{r. Coleman: Counsel for the defendant, L. 
C. Wright; excepts to the action of the Court in giving plain-
tiff's instruction No. 2 for the reasons above stated. 
RE: DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
By the Court: I will give instructions'' A'', ''B'', and ''D'', 
but I can't give "C ". 
By Mr. ·Coleman: Counsel for the defendant, L. C. Wright, 
excepts to the action of the Court in refusing his instruction 
"C" on the ground that the failure of Wright to give a signal, 
even assuming that he did fail to give a signal, could not have 
been the proximate cause of the accident if he did in fact have 
his car in the middle of the street as testimony so states, and 
for the further reason that the instruction correctly states the 
law and -is applicable to the case at bar. 
MEMO. BY THE COURT: The question of whether or not 
the failure to give a signal was the proximate cause of the 
accident is for the jury. 
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pag·e 87 ~ Note: The following instructions, "1 and 2 "~ 
were given for the _plaintiff. 
1. 
The court instructs the jury that an independent coittractor 
is one who, exercising an independent employment, con-
tracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and 
without being subject to the control of his employer, exce:pt a~ 
to the result of his work. The court further instructs the jury 
that selection of the servant, payment of wages, power of dis-
missal, and particularly the power of control, are circum-
stances to be consider-ed in deter:mining the question as to 
whether or not James I. Forbes was an independent contrac-
tor in this case. The court further instructs the jury that if 
you find from the evidence· that the said Piedmont Caf-e is 
owned and operated by F. L. Forbes and that he employs 
Jam-es I. Forbes i_n the capacity of manager of same, and if 
vou further find from the evidence that the said F. L. Forbes 
paid the bills for servicing/ said automobiles used~ in his busi-
ness by the said -L. C. Wright and that the said L. C~ Wright 
was paid from the funds in the hands of James I. Forbes be-
longing to F. L. Forbes, and if you further find .from the evi-
denc-e that F. L .. Forbes had any control whatsoever over the 
hiring or the firing of the said L. C. Wright or could in any 
way direct him and give him orders which he was bound to 
obey, then the said L. C. Wright would be the servant and the 
employee of the said F. L. Forbes. 
2. 
page 88 } The court instructs the jury that negligence is 
the failure of a person to perform a certain act re-
quired of him by law under the circumstances, or the commis-
sion by him of an act which by law is prohibited under the 
circumstances. The court further instructs the jury that 
every driver of an automobile who intends to start, stop, or 
turn, or partly turn from a direct line, shall first see that such 
movement can be made in safety and whenever the operation 
of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall .. 
give a signal of his intention to make said movement plainly 
visible to the driver of such other vehicle of his intention to 
make such movement, which said signal is pr-escribed by law 
and is as follows: for a left-hand turn, the arm extended in 
a horizontal position, for a right-hand turn, the arm extended 
upward, and for a slowing down or stop, the arm extended 
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downward. The court also instructs the jury that it is the· 
duty of drivers of v-ehicles standing or parked at the curb or· 
edge of a str-eet to give such signals of their intention to 1nove 
into traffic, and if you find that the said defendant, L. C. 
Wright's, automobile was parked at the curbing on Main 
Street and that he drove the sam-e away from said curbing· and 
into the line of traffice, in which the plaintiff was proceed-: 
i,ng without g-iving the proper signal, or without seeing that 
same could be done with safety to himself and th-e plaintiff· 
and that said acts on his part were the proximate cause of 
.. the plaintiff's injuries, you will find for the plain-· 
page 89 ~ tiff as to the said defendant, L. C. Wright; and: 
if you further find from the evidence that the saiil: 
L. C~ Wright at said time 'vas the servant and employee of 
the said defendant, F. L. Forbes, you will also find in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, F. L. Forbes, and 
as~ess the damages of the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff was· 
himself guilty of contributory negligence. 
- No.te: The following are the instructions given for the· 
defendants,. L. C. Wright and F. L. Forbes. 
A. 
The court instructs the jury that the mere happening of au-
accident places no responsibility on any one, a1:1d that tho 
plaintiff Kirby E .. ·viar can only recover by proving first, 
by a preponderance of the. evidence t~at the defendants were 
g·uilty of negligence, and second, that such negligence was 
the proximate cause of the ac~ident. 
B. 
The Court instruGts the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that Kirby E. Viar saw, or should by the ex~rcise. 
of reasonable care have seen the L. C. Wright automobile on 
the street in time to avoid the- accident by the exercise of or-, 
·dinary care, and if you further believe that such 
page 90 ~ neglig·ence proximately contributed to the accident,: 
you must find for the defendants F. L. Forbes ancl 
~. c. wright. . . 
. . . . . ,· ., D . . . ... ·.. . 
. The courf{~~~J.u~is t~~~-~~ it was the duty of Kirby; 
E .. V.iar, the driver of the motorcycl~, to. ope~ate . the sa~~; 
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at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than. 
is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, 
surface and width of the street, and any other conditions then 
-existing; to keep a proper lookout for automobiles in his line 
of travel; to keep his said motorcycle under complete control 
so as to be able to promptly check or stop the same whenever 
danger of injury or accident becomes, or should have become· 
evident or probable, and the Court instructs the jury that if 
they believe from the evidence that Kirby E. Viar failed to 
<Operate his motorcycle in accordance with any of the particu-
lars aforesaid, and that his failur-e in any of these respects 
llroximate!y contributed to tb.e-.ru<.cident, then you must find 
for the Cleiendants F'. L. ""Forbes anaL. C. Wright . 
. - Note:: The following instruction was offered by the de-
fendants, L. C. Wright and F. L. Forbes and was refused by 
the Court. · 
C. Refused. 
The Court inst~ucts the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that L. C. Wright had his car parked on 
page 91 f 1\1:ain Street, that he started the same and pulled 
away from the curb to pass around a car parked in 
'front of him,· and that he had gotten out beyond th-e other 
parked car and ha9. his car straight or approximately straight 
in the street when the motorcycle on which IGrby E. :Viar 
was riding came from the rear and struck the said car on the 
·rear portion thereof, then the said Wright was guilty of no 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident, 
·:whether he gave O!' failed to give a signal as he started his 
car away from the curb to pull into traffic, and you must find 
for th~_ ~cfen~ants L. C. 'Yright -~nd F. L. Forbes. 
J\.farked: "Refused, D. :p. H." 
page 92} CERTIFICATE. 
I, Don P. Halsey, Judge of the Circuit Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, Virginia, who presided over the trial of the 
case of l{irby E. Viar, who sues by his next friend, J. E. Viar, 
vs. F. L .. Foi·bes.and L. C. Wright, to the record, testimony and 
other incidents of which said trial this certificate is attached 
do hereby certify tl1at the foregoing is a true and correct copy 
of all testimony, agreen1ents and other incidents which were 
introduced or that occurred during said trial, including all 
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instructions given and refused and questions raised, and a11 
ru!ing·s thereon, including exceptions, grounds of objections 
to the admission and exclusion.o(;e;vidence, and of the refusal 
of the n1otion to strike out·th<{.evidenc'e .with a statement of 
the grounds of said motion. 
I ,.dg ,~urther certify that the said case was tried in the Cir-
. cuit Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 1st .day 
of April; 1933, and it· appears in writing• that the plaintiff 
ICirby E. Viar by his attorney has. had reasonable notice of 
the .t~me and place when this testimony and other incidents 
of ttial would be tendered and presented to the undersigned 
for certification, which is certified within sixty days after 
final ~judgment. 
G~~erl. under my hand and seal this 25th day of April, 1933. 
DON P. HALSEY, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit' Court for the City of 
· Lynchburg, Virginia. 
Filed in -Clerk's Office April 25th, 1933. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN; Clerk. 
pag~,~9~ J I, Hnb.ert H. Martin, clerk of the circuit court of 
. . the city of Lynchburg, hereby certify that the fore-
going is a trb.'e transcript of the record of the case of Kirby 
E. Viar, by J .. E. Viar,.his next friend, vs. L~ C. Wright and 
F. L~' ~«;n;l}es, tr~c,l~ng· ~as Piedmont Cafe, and I further cer-
tify. t)1at notices as required by Section 6253-f, and Section 
6339 of the Oode,·wet'e duly given, as appears to a paper 
writing. filed with the record of said case. 
T~ clerk's fe~ for <making this transcript is $10.00. 
Given under.my hand this 6th day of May, 1933. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS. C. C. 
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